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Abstract
The purpose of this research was to explore the phenomenon of public-public
outsourcing partnerships as it may be employed by the DoD from a Federal
Government perspective. Current outsourcing methods, guidance, and models are
discussed as well as outsourcing related theories. Based upon the literature reviewed, a
conceptual public-public outsourcing decision model is presented. A case study of the
Brooks AFB initiative is then used to analyze the conceptual model.
We find the scope of current outsourcing models unduly limits the options
available to decision-makers. Our analysis of the conceptual model with the Brooks
AFB initiative yields an analytical public-public outsourcing decision model, which
also depicts the overall process path along which a decision-maker will travel. This
model improves upon previous models by explicitly allowing for the possibility of
outsourcing some inherently governmental functions to other governmental entities,
which may be at or below the Federal level. The end result is that decision-makers are
now armed with an innovative decision-making tool that expands the envelope of
opportunities to reduce base operations, support, and infrastructure costs.

IX

PUBLIC-PUBLIC PARTNERSHIPS: DEVELOPMENT OF AN ALTERNATIVE
OUTSOURCING METHOD DECISION MODEL
I. Introduction
Chapter Overview
This chapter provides a top-level background of the current situation in which the
Air Force, and the Department of Defense finds itself. It addresses the need to cut costs,
especially with respect to base support functions and infrastructure, in order to modernize
the force. In particular, attention is directed to current outsourcing policies, procedures,
and initiatives.
The chapter also discusses the value of this research effort and the contribution it
is intended to make to outsourcing decision-makers throughout the Department of
Defense. The chapter concludes with a research problem statement, and the presentation
of our investigative questions. The problem statement will establish the scope of the
research effort. The investigative questions serve to focus our research effort so as to be
able to provide some resolution to the problem under inquiry.

Background
The Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) has allocated $500,000 to develop what
is being termed the "Brooks Model" (Human Systems Center, 1998: 7). The Human
Systems Center (HSC) at Brooks Air Force Base, Texas has been chosen to take the lead
in the development of the next generation of acquisition initiatives concerning the
outsourcing of base support functions. The goal is to develop and implement a new way

of "reducing significantly infrastructure costs while maintaining or improving the support
for Department of Defense missions and personnel" (Human Systems Center, 1998:10).
The base awarded a contract to Science Applications International Corporation (S AIC)
on 7 August 1998 to perform a study on the support functions which could be outsourced;
either competitively to private sector firms, or to the City of San Antonio, Texas.
Furthermore, SAIC was tasked to provide a an implementation plan for their
recommended approach to reduce the operating costs associated with each of the base's
support functions (SAIC, 1999: 1-1).
How can military installations meet mission requirements while being subjected
to continuous budget cuts? This is a question government and military leaders have been
grappling with since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The
end of the Cold War brought about a perceived need to decrease the military budget and
shift those appropriations to other government programs. This perception has been
coupled with the perception that outside solutions (i.e., performance by private sector
firms) are more cost effective than performance by in-house organizations.
There have been a number of programs initiated to make the force fit the budget.
One program was to provide incentives to uniformed personnel to voluntarily separate
from the service. Fewer members equate to smaller payroll and fewer support personnel,
thus less money expended. Another measure was the establishment of the Base ReAlignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) to determine which military installations
should be closed. Fewer bases equals less operating expenditures. Again, the idea of
fewer is better prevails.

During this draw-down of personnel and installations, the notion of outsourcing
and privatization gained momentum. Although the primary tool to initiate outsourcing
and privatization, the A-76 Study, has been around since 1955 (Bjtlich and Hickman,
1996:30), the armed forces began using it more frequently during the 1980s (Defense
Science Board, 1996:43). The outsourcing and privatization measures have met with
limited success.
Statutory restrictions have played a factor in this limited success. These
restrictions have limited "what functions are subject to the A-76 process, who has the
authority to initiate an A-76 review, and how much time may be taken to complete the
reviews. Timelines, up-front costs, and reporting requirements have also discouraged A76 actions" (Defense Science Board, 1996:43). Other factors that cloud the success of
outsourcing and privatization matters can be broken down into three major categories:
accounting for savings, cost growth problems, and managerial concerns.
Cost growth problems fall into five types: statutory wage rate increases, changes
in contract requirements, deficiencies in written statements of contracting requirements,
poor contract administration and surveillance, and lack of competition for contracts
(Snyder, 1995:43-50). Some of these problems are a direct result of limited experience
on the part of government contracting personnel, while others are perpetuated by outside
agencies (Department of Labor) or unforeseen circumstances (i.e. military conflict,
reorganization, BRAC, etc.).
The managerial concerns highlight the following four issues: lack of contracting
authority and control of resources, reduced flexibility, the profit motives of contractors,
and potential corruption (Snyder, 1995:51-59). While these concerns are valid, they

seem to promote an adversarial relationship. It comes down to a matter of trust; the
government must trust the contractor and the contractor must trust the government.
Unfortunately, there are often procedural and experiential factors impeding trust
formation and development.
Research Contribution
Optimally, it is hoped this research will produce an infrastructure blueprint that
will facilitate process improvements that could ultimately improve the way the Air Force
operates its military installations. This research will facilitate the improvement of base
operating efficiencies by expanding the outsourcing options available to decision-makers.
Prior to this research effort and the SAIC study conducted at Brooks AFB, decisionmakers have been confined to outsourcing functions, deemed to be commercial activities,
to private sector firms. This research will assist decision-makers in identifying functions,
deemed to be inherently governmental, which can be outsourced to other public sector
entities. Thus, it may be possible for bases, in the future, to form partnerships with local
governments. As a result, instead of classifying functions as cost centers, the Air Force
may be able to designate some as revenue centers. By having revenue generation in some
functions, the Air Force would be able to offset the decreases in the yearly defense
appropriations bills and maintain a viable, technologically superior force.
The minimum benefit of this research will be to identify a new way for DoD to
reduce the expense of installation operation. Some of the opportunities may be spelled
out in the Brooks Model. These opportunities include "out granting of space, raw land
development, utilities privatization, commercial hotel, and develop military family
housing alternatives" (Human Systems Center, 1998:7). It will take years and money to

determine folly if the Brooks Model warranted the time, effort, and money used in an
attempt to find an alternative to standard outsourcing and privatization initiatives. The
Brooks Model will be given every opportunity to succeed. The Secretary of the Air
Force (SECAF) designated Brooks AFB as a "Reinvention Laboratory" (Human
Systems Center, 1998:11) and provided $500,000 for the initial study.
It is time to look towards a new way of meeting the goal of decreasing military
expenditures while maintaining the most formidable and mission capable military force
in the world today. The primary mission of the armed forces to protect this country's
national interest has not changed, but how the military accomplishes this mission seems
to be changing. The armed forces are looking for more cost effective approaches to
offset changing environmental conditions. Outsourcing and privatization measures under
the A-76 study strategy can only do so much. The city-base concept may not be the
singular answer for all our efficiency concerns, but it may prove to be another step in
accomplishing this goal.
Problem Statement
The DOD operates in an environment of budget uncertainty. Even with promised
additional resources, top-level DOD officials are looking to infrastructure reform
initiatives as a mechanism for cutting operations and support cost (O&S). The savings are
intended for use in weapons modernization.
The problem, until now, has been that support and infrastructure cost reduction
initiatives have been limited by the OMB A-76 guidance regarding the outsourcing of
commercial activities to private sector firms. Essentially, until now, once a function was
deemed to be inherently governmental or a core activity, the outsourcing effort was

terminated. No alternative outsourcing option for inherently governmental or "core"
activities was available to the decision-maker.
Despite the apparent lack of outsourcing alternatives, Brooks AFB is considering
an innovative outsourcing initiative. It seeks, in part, to form a partnership with the City
of San Antonio. As part of this initiative, San Antonio would provide for some of the
base's support functions (e.g., fire protection and police services). Other functions would
be outsourced using the traditional A-76 process.
The intent of this research is to explore alternative methods of outsourcing base
support functions. We believe that by conducting a scientific exploration, and
examination, of alternative outsourcing options, future decision-makers will be better
equipped to tackle the challenge of reducing base operating costs.

Investigative Questions
Investigative Question 1. "What outsourcing option(s) are available to the Federal
Government (e.g., the Department of Defense)?"
Investigative Question 2. "Under what circumstances can, or should, the different
outsourcing options be considered?"
Investigative Question 3. "Do the differences between outsourcing options require
the use of a different outsourcing decision model?"
Investigative Question 4. "Is there currently a decision model available, and
applicable, to the Federal Government that can be used when making decisions
concerning the initiation of public-public outsourcing partnerships?"

Investigative Question 5. "What would a decision model look like that could be
used by the Federal Government when evaluating functions, which are not commercial
activities available for outsourcing, but which may be performed by other governmental
agencies (i.e., public-public partnerships)?"

Summary
This chapter provided an overview of the current status of the Department of
Defense's budget-constrained operating environment. It also discussed how DoD officials
are searching for ways to reduce base support and infrastructure costs in order to alleviate
some of the budgetary pressures from force modernization plans. As part of the cost
reduction effort, the DoD is relying heavily upon the outsourcing of commercial activities
to private sector firms.
Some decision-makers in Congress, the DoD, and the Air Force believe the
current budget-constrained environment calls for innovative alternatives to traditional
outsourcing solutions to be found and implemented. Brooks AFB has answered this call
by studying the feasibility of establishing a service-provider partnership with the City of
San Antonio.
The political pressure to reform our acquisition processes, and the budgetary
pressures which constrain the DoD's modernization plans, establish the necessity to
explore and expand the cost-reducing methods at our disposal. We believe that by
answering our investigative questions, decision-makers will be armed with a more
comprehensive arsenal of cost-reduction options.

II Literature Review

Chapter Overview
This chapter is intended to provide a basis of knowledge, from which the
investigative questions can be answered. The chapter begins with outsourcing
fundamentals. In this section, the objectives of outsourcing are discussed along with the
advantages and disadvantages of outsourcing functions once provided internally.
Following this section is a discussion of the current outsourcing guidance available to
DoD outsourcing decision-makers. The discussion, in this section, begins with an
overview of the government's responsibility to protect the public interest. It then
addresses the scope of, and concerns related to, the OMB Circular A-76.
The chapter's focus then moves to transaction cost and partnership issues, which
should be of concern to decision-makers during the outsourcing decision process. A
review of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory is presented along with a critique,
and elaboration, of the theory. A brief discussion of how these theories may be applied to
DoD outsourcing decisions is then presented. Following the discussion on the application
of the TCE theory to the DoD is a discussion on synergy and partnerships that result from
outsourcing arrangements.
The remainder of the chapter addresses outsourcing decision models. Current
outsourcing decision models are identified along with the limitations placed upon
decision-makers by the models. In the final chapter of the section, a conceptual decision
model is presented which addresses the decisions that, according to the outsourcing
literature, a decision-maker should consider when contemplating a public-public
outsourcing arrangement.

Outsourcing Fundamentals
Increasingly, firms in the private sector are evaluating alternative means of
reducing costs and enhancing competitiveness. Beyond streamlining internal processes,
firms have increasingly turned to the "make or buy" decision (i.e., outsourcing).
However, some warn that all too often, "outsourcing decisions are based exclusively on a
single motivating factor (e.g., cost)" (Grover and Teng, 1993: 34). Furthermore, when
"low-cost service delivery alone is the criterion for contracting out," says Prager and
Desai, it "may lead to woefully inappropriate policy decisions by failing to distinguish
between cost and efficiency or productivity criteria" (1996: 189).
In addition to cost reduction, the following objectives of outsourcing must be
considered:
Improving business focus by reducing management resources and
attention spent on non-core activities and freeing them for use in
core areas;
Gaining access to the world-class capabilities (including
investments in technology, methodologies, and people) of firms
whose core competency is to provide the outsourced activity;
Accelerating re-engineering efforts to reduce cycle times and
improve quality by having a provider that is already re-engineered
to world-class standards take over the process;
Sharing risk by pooling investment costs in the outsourced
technology made by the provider on behalf of multiple clients;
Reducing operating costs by contracting with a provider that can
achieve economies of scale or other cost advantages based on
specialization;
Converting capital investment in non-core business functions into
operating expenses, and targeting capital funds on core areas; and

Gaining better control over a function currently being provided inhouse that is not meeting performance goals or customer
expectations. (Pint and Baldwin, 1997: 25)
Consideration of the above objectives will facilitate achievement of the following
advantages of outsourcing: 1) Convert fixed costs to variable costs, thereby providing
flexibility in an economic downturn; 2) Balance work force requirements; 3) Reduce
capital investment requirements; 4) Reduce cost via suppliers' economies of scale and
lower wage structures; 5) Accelerate new product development; 6) Gain access to
invention and innovation from suppliers; 7) Focus resources on high value-added
activities (Welch andNayak, 1992: 23).
While outsourcing may assist an organization in achieving the aforementioned
advantages, the organization must be cognizant of the notion of corporate strategic risk.
This concept can be defined as "corporate strategic moves that cause returns to vary, that
involve venturing into the unknown, and that may result in corporate ruin - moves for
which the outcomes and probabilities may be only partially known and where hard-todefine goals may not be met" (Baird and Thomas, 1985:231). Thus, before an
organization commits itself to an outsourcing decision, it must realize there is a "danger
in applying the classical cost-oriented make-or-buy decision process; i.e., basing sourcing
decisions primarily on cost, with insufficient regard for strategic imperatives" (Welch and
Nayak, 1992: 25).
One impact that outsourcing may have on an organization's strategic risk level,
and its strategic imperatives, is related to the issues of control and flexibility.
Contracting creates a gap in the direct chain of authority between
decision-makers and program results. It replaces old problems with
new ones...It imposes costs, especially in monitoring, that make
the transaction more expensive. Such transaction costs, in turn,
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reduce the efficiency of the competition prescription. (Kettl, 1993:
29)
The issue of monitoring will be discussed below. However, it can be said that if an
activity is closely associated with an organization's strategic imperatives, the
organization may choose not to outsource the activity.
Another issue that arises which may affect an organization's strategic risk level,
and its strategic imperatives, relates to the relational governance structure discussed in
the section on TCE theory. When an organization moves from hierarchy to one of the
hybrid, or intermediate, forms of governance, it must consider the issues associated with
creating buyer-supplier partnerships. This too will be discussed in more detail in a
subsequent section. However, it has been observed that
The very nature of command and control changes as partnerships
replace clear hierarchies. Long-term relationships govern these
partnerships. They are relationships based on mutual trust and are
disciplined by a common concern about reputation and by the
availability of alternative sources and customers if expectations are
not realized. (Camm, 1996: 42)
Principal-agent theory discusses these issues and others related to transactions
governed by contracts. Kettl uses principal-agent theory to discuss the contracting
relationship that arises as a result of outsourcing and the formation of public-private
partnerships. He argues that organizations must consider monitoring arrangements and
their concomitant costs. These arrangements and their costs are directly associated with
Williamson's notion of opportunism. He notes, "Principals must try to find a balance
between the level of shirking they can tolerate and the amount they must pay in
monitoring costs to achieve that level" (Williamson 1993: 25).
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The principal-agent literature uses the phrase moral hazard to describe a situation
wherein one party (typically the agent) has more information than the other (typically the
principal). Thus, when making the outsourcing decision, organizations in the principal
role need to consider the issue of information asymmetry and its related affect on the
monitoring arrangements employed to ensure success.
Another issue raised in the principal-agent literature is adverse selection. This
describes a situation in which the principal chooses a partner that cannot (or will not)
perform as promised. One way in which this occurs is when the agent misrepresents its
ability to perform (and/or the principal was unable to adequately ascertain the agents
ability during source selection).
The principal-agent literature, like that of TCE, suggests the use of incentives and
safeguards to counterbalance these potential problems. The principal-agent literature
focuses primarily on ex ante incentives as a means of aligning the interests of both
parties. The term, ex ante, refers to incentives used prior to the selection and award of a
contract. TCE primarily emphasizes ex post safeguards as means of mitigating the risks
associated with supplier opportunism. The term, ex post, refers to those controls placed
over a contractor after award of a contract, and to the penalties that may be imposed upon
the supplier.

A-76 Studies
Our attention in this section turns toward the Federal Government's outsourcing
guidance and processes. Having discussed outsourcing fundamentals and issues of
concern to outsourcing decision-makers, we now consider how these fundamentals and
issues relate to the roles and responsibilities of the Federal Government with respect to its
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outsourcing efforts. This section concludes with a discussion of the limitations of A-76
and concerns related to A-76.
Government Actions and the Public Interest. The discussion thus far has been
general in nature, and rooted in literature concerned primarily with outsourcing decisions
made by private sector firms. This section turns to outsourcing as employed by the
Federal Government (in particular, by the DoD). Thus, it is necessary to first discuss the
unique nature and responsibilities of the Federal Government (and DoD).
Perhaps the most significant difference between private sector firms and the
Federal Government, with respect to the issue of outsourcing concerns the Government's
responsibility to provide "inherently Governmental functions." The Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) provides guidance on what is considered an inherently Governmental
function. It states
Inherently governmental function means, as a matter of policy, a
function that is so intimately related to the public interest as to
mandate performance by Government employees. This definition
is a policy determination, not a legal definition. An inherently
governmental function includes activities that require either the
exercise of discretion in applying governmental authority, or the
making of value judgments in making decisions for the
Government. Governmental functions normally fall into two
categories: the act of governing, i.e., the discretionary exercise of
Government authority, and monetary transactions and entitlements,
(a) An inherently governmental function involves, among other
things, the interpretation and execution of the laws of the
United States so as to—
(1) Bind the United States to take or not to take some action by
contract, policy, regulation, authorization, order, or
otherwise;
(2) Determine, protect, and advance United States economic,
political, territorial, property, or other interests by military
or diplomatic action, civil or criminal judicial proceedings,
contract management, or otherwise;
(3) Significantly affect the life, liberty, or property of private
persons;
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(4) Commission, appoint, direct, or control officers or
employees of the United States; or
(5) Exert ultimate control over the acquisition, use, or
disposition of the property, real or personal, tangible or
intangible, of the United States, including the collection,
control, or disbursement of Federal Funds.
(b) Inherently governmental functions do not normally include
gathering information for or providing advice, opinions,
recommendations, or ideas to Government officials. They also
do not include functions that are primarily ministerial and
internal in nature, such as building security, mail operations,
operation of cafeterias, housekeeping, facilities operations and
maintenance, warehouse operations, motor vehicle fleet
management operations, or other routine electrical or
mechanical services. The list of commercial activities included
in the attachment to Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
Circular No. A-76 is an authoritative, nonexclusive list of
functions which are not inherently governmental functions.
(FAR 7.501,1999)
Therefore, when the Federal Government contemplates outsourcing, it must first
determine whether the activity has been, or should be, regarded as an inherently
governmental function. With respect to outsourcing decisions made by the DoD, it must
consider not only whether a function is inherently governmental, but also whether the
function is a national defense activity (see definition in Table 1).
Some have observed that as a result of the Government's unique role, it must
consider issues that do not directly affect or constrain private sector organizations. While
efficiency is a common concern of both Government and private sector firms, it "is one,
but only one, goal of a government operating in the public interest" (Kettl, 1993: 6).
Other criteria that shape the public interest include: efficiency, effectiveness, capacity,
responsiveness, and trust and confidence (Kettl, 1993: 17-19).
With respect to the criteria of effectiveness, capacity, and responsiveness, the
Government should be aware of what has been called the "hollow organization." First
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introduced by Business Week in 1986, the term describes "an organizational form that
replaces internal production with a network of subcontractors" (Crawford and Krahn,
1998: 108). When applying the concept to Governmental units, the term "hollow state"
has been used. The key point for the Government to consider is that, although
outsourcing functions may have positive efficiency results, it may have negative impacts
on effectiveness, capacity, and responsiveness.
With respect to the criteria of trust and confidence, Government personnel should
remember that
Despite the enthusiasm for entrepreneurial government and
privatization, the most egregious tales of waste, fraud, and abuse in
government programs have often involved greedy, corrupt, and
often criminal activity by the government's private partners—and
weak government management to detect and correct these
problems. (Kettl, 1993:5)
This highlights the need to assess the proclivity of the Government's potential
outsourcing partner to behave opportunistically. Additionally, the Government needs to
devise and implement a monitoring strategy with safeguards appropriate for the particular
outsourcing arrangement.
In their final analysis of the TCE and business management literature, Pint and
Baldwin state that both "asset specificity and core competencies seem to be important
concepts for the Air Force to consider in its outsourcing decisions" (Pint and Baldwin,
1997: 73). The business management literature suggests that core competencies can be
considered as 1) two or three activities that are most critical to the organization's future
success, or 2) organizational skills and knowledge that are difficult to duplicate and
create unique sources of value (Pint and Baldwin, 1997: 23). For our purposes in this
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research, Air Force (or DoD) core competencies are considered to be military essential
functions as defined in Table 1.
Table 1. A-76 Terms and Definitions
Term

Definition

Commercial activity

"A commercial activity is the process resulting in a product or
service that is or could be obtained from a private sector
source (OMB Circular A-76 Revised Supplemental Handbook:
1996)."
Core capability
"A core capability is a commercial activity operated by a cadre
of highly skilled employees, in a specialized technical or
scientific development area, to ensure that a minimum
capability is maintained (OMB Circular A-76 Revised
Supplemental Handbook: 1996)."
Inherently
An inherently governmental activity is one that is so intimately
governmental activity related to the public interest as to mandate performance by
Federal employees (OMB Circular A-76 Revised Supplemental
Handbook: 1996)."
Interservice Support "The provision of a commercial activity, in accordance with an
Agreement (ISSA)
interservice support agreement, on a reimbursable basis (OMB
Circular A-76 Revised Supplemental Handbook: 1996)."
National defense
activity

"A national defense activity is a commercial activity that is
approved by the Secretary of Defense, or designee, as being
subject to deployment in a direct military combat support role
(OMB Circular A-76 Revised Supplemental Handbook: 1996)."

Military essential
function

"A function which must be performed by a uniformed member
of the Air Force rather than a Federal employee or civilian
contractor. The following are various justifications for HQ USAF
classifying a function as military essential: Those positions that
directly contribute to the prosecution of war (combat or direct
combat support), are required by law, are required by law, are
military due to custom or tradition, are needed for career
viability and overseas rotations, or require a skill not available
in the private sector (Outsourcing Guide for Contracting:
1996)."
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Table 1. A-76 Terms and Definitions (continued)
Term

Definition

"Privatization is the process of changing a public entity or
enterprise to private control or ownership. It does not include
determinations as to whether a support service should be
obtained through public or private resources, when the
Government retains full responsibility and control over the
delivery of those services (OMB Circular A-76 Revised
Supplemental Handbook: 1996)."
"A recurring commercial activity is one that is required by the
Recurring
commercial activity Government on a consistent and long term basis. This
definition does not imply an hourly, daily, monthly or annual
requirement, but must, in a general sense, be repetitive in
nature, wherein the expected workload can be reasonably
estimated (OMB Circular A-76 Revised Supplemental
Handbook: 1996)."
Privatization

All of the above considerations are important to Government personnel charged
with the responsibility for outsourcing decisions. Unfortunately, there is a limited amount
of official and practical guidance available to those decision-makers. The majority of the
existing guidance is contained in the OMB Circular A-76 Revised Supplemental
Handbook (March 1996), OFPP Policy Letter 92-1 (September 1992), and the AFLMA
Outsourcing Guide for Contracting (June 1996). The two following sections will discuss
some of the limitations and concerns related to the A-76 guidance.
Limitations. The OMB Circular A-76 is not directly applicable to services and
situations for which Public-Public partnerships may be warranted. The "Revised
Supplemental Handbook" to the OMB Circular A-76 does state, however, that the
"reinvention" of Government must take into consideration a wide range of alternative
options for meeting the Government's needs.
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The reinvention of Government begins by focusing on core
mission competencies and service requirements. Thus, the
reinvention process must consider a wide range of options,
including: the consolidation, restructuring or reengineering of
activities, privatization options, make or buy decisions, the
adoption of better business management practices, the
development of joint ventures with the private sector, asset sales,
the possible devolution of activities to State and local
governments [emphasis added] and the termination of obsolete
services or programs. (OMB Circular A-76 Revised Supplemental
Handbook: 1996)

However, in the sentence that follows the above citation, it says "In the context of this
larger reinvention effort, the scope of this Supplemental Handbook is limited to the
conversion of recurring commercial activities to or from in-house, contract or ISS A
performance (OMB Circular A-76 Revised Supplemental Handbook: 1996)."
Concerns. A key concern of some A-76 critics has been that the Government
relies solely on the cost criterion in making outsourcing decisions. For more on this
critique, see the discussion below on current outsourcing models.
Another concern has arisen as a result of GAO findings. According to Kettl, the
Federal Government has
dramatically expanded its reliance on private contractors for a host
of support services....Some of these services were 'inherently
governmental' in nature, according to GAO, which meant that
private contractors were exercising government's core powers and
basic management decisions. (Kettl, 1993: 12)
This, in itself, appears to be sufficient justification for a decision model that better guides
decision-makers through the process of determining when and which functions are
appropriate candidates for public-public partnership arrangements. A decision model
which explicitly provides outsourcing alternatives (i.e., public-public partnerships) would
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assist decision-makers who are often under considerable pressure to outsource support
functions in order to save money and meet mission objectives.
A concern relevant to both public-private, and public-public, outsourcing
arrangements is related to the governance structure erected to facilitate the transaction. It
has been said that
Government's growing reliance on its partners in the private and
nonprofit sectors means that its success in many cases has come to
depend in large part on how well those partners perform. That
reliance also raises serious questions about governance and
accountability. (Kettl, 1993:13)
Thus, as part of any outsourcing decision, the Federal Government must ensure that its
reliance on the provider of the function does not have a negative impact on the Federal
Government's ability to execute its roles and responsibilities. According to Camm,
The lesson for DoD is a paradox: The more control DoD exercises
over contractors to protect its investment in the customized assets
its contractors use to provide sophisticated support services to
DoD, the harder it is for those contractors to provide the benefits
typically attributed to commercial practice. (1996: 29)
Decision-makers need to understand, therefore, that while maintaining control over the
service provider is essential, it is equally important that there be a balance between
control and flexibility. A proper balance should allow the Federal government to realize
cost efficiencies without sacrificing strategic imperatives.
Yet another concern has been discussed in the literature that relates to the degree
of competition that the Government may be able to exploit when outsourcing its support
functions. With respect to the Government's involvement (i.e., outsourcing transactions)
in markets lacking the basic assumptions of market competition, two questions have been
raised.
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First, if it is to be efficient and effective, to what degree can the
government rely on the market to shape its transactions? Second,
to the degree that the conditions required for competitive markets
do not apply, does the government have the capacity to manage
these contracts effectively? To the degree that it does not, the
quality of public services will inevitably diminish and cost will
rise. (Kettl, 1993:17)
The second observation in the above quotation is especially interesting as it
relates to the Federal Government's efforts to pursue outsourcing arrangements with
alternative governmental entities. First, state and/or local governments are non-profit
entities. As such, they are not driven by the same motivating factors whereby private
firms are driven. Second, when the Federal Government contemplates a public-public
outsourcing arrangement, it is likely that there will be only one alternative governmental
entity considered (i.e., the local government). Clearly, these two elements highlight
significant differences between traditional outsourcing practices and public-public
initiatives.

Transaction Cost Economics Fundamentals
Oliver Williamson is considered the champion of Transaction Cost Economics
theory (TCE). In his many works, Williamson has focused on the choice of an optimal
governance structure for transactions based upon the characteristics of the transaction and
the concomitant costs. TCE has gained popularity in recent years since it can be
effectively used to guide decision-makers through the outsourcing decision process. It has
been noted that "political scientists are just beginning to apply transaction cost arguments
to the issue of contracting out services in the public sector" (Clingermayer and Feiock,
1997:232). By borrowing from Williamson's TCE theory, we hope to develop and test a
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public-public outsourcing decision model. We believe that, by assessing transactions, one
may find a reliable model for making public-public outsourcing decisions.
In the remainder of the section, Williamson's work on TCE will be discussed. So
too, will the work of Ring and Van de Ven (which elaborates upon TCE using different
assumptions). Important definitions and assumptions used in TCE theory can be found in
Table 2 and Table 3, respectively.

Table 2. TCE Definitions
Term

Definition

Transaction costs

The "economic equivalent of friction in physical systems"
(Williamson, 1985: 21). Examples include "the negotiating ,
monitoring, and enforcement costs that have to be borne to allow an
exchange between two parties to take place" (Jones and Hill, 1988:

Governance
Structure

1).
"The institutional matrix in which the integrity of a transaction is
decided. In the commercial sector, three discrete structural
governance alternatives are commonly recognized: classical market,
hybrid contracting, and hierarchy" (Williamson, 1996: 378).

Market

"The arena in which autonomous parties engage in exchange.
Markets can be either thick or thin. Classical markets are thick, in
which case there are large numbers of buyers and sellers on each
side of the transaction and identity is not important, because each
can go its own way at negligible cost to the other. Thin markets are
characterized by fewness, which is mainly due to asset specificity"
(Williamson, 1996:378).

Hybrid

"Long-term contractual relations that preserve autonomy but provide
added transaction-specific safeguards, compared with the market"
(Williamson, 1996:378).

Hierarchy

"Transactions that are placed under unified ownership(buyer and
supplier are in the same enterprise) and subject to administrative
controls (an authority relation, to include fiat)" (Williamson, 1996:
378).
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Table 3. TCE Assumptions
Definition

Bounded Rationality A condition resulting from cognitive limits of humans in which
behavior is "intendedly rational, but only unitedly so" (Williamson
1996: 36).
Opportunism

The act of engaging in "self-interest seeking with guile." Refers to
the incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially to
calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or
otherwise confuse" (Williamson, 1985:47).

Transactional

Asset specificity

"The degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative
uses and by alternative users without sacrifice of productive value"
Williamson, 1996: 59).

Uncertainty

A condition present, to varying degrees, and arising when
"incomplete contracting and asset specificity are joined.
(Williamson, 1996:60).

Frequency

The degree to which parties are engaged in transactions of a
recurrent or occaisonal nature (Williamson, 1985:60).
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In his work on TCE, Williamson stresses the importance of asset specificity as a
major transaction characteristic. Further, he concludes asset specificity is a necessary
condition for selecting the appropriate governance structure. With respect to the forms of
asset specificity that should be considered in a transaction cost analysis of the "make or
buy" decision, Williamson states that
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Without purporting to be exhaustive, asset specificity distinctions
of six kinds have been made: (1) site specificity, as where
successive stations are located in a cheek-by-jowl relation to each
other so as to economize on inventory and transportation expenses;
(2) physical asset specificity, such as specialized dies that are
required to produce a component; (3) human asset specificity that
arises in a learning-by-doing fashion; (4) dedicated assets, which
are discrete investments in general purpose plant that are made at
the behest of a particular customer; to which (5) brand name
capital and (6) temporal specificity have been added. (Williamson,
1996: 59)
Williamson has created the following table to show how governance structures are
arranged along a continuum according to the transaction characteristics of asset
specificity and frequency.
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Figure 1. "Efficient Governance" Continuum (Williamson, 1985)

He uses the terms "Trilateral governance" and "Bilateral governance" to refer to
"Hybrid" structures. "Trilateral governance" refers to a buyer-supplier relationship
wherein disputes may be referred to, and adjudicated by, a third party (e.g., an arbitrator
or the courts). "Bilateral governance" applies to a buyer-supplier relationship wherein the
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parties to the transaction establish, a priori, an internal conflict resolution procedure. The
term "Unified governance" refers to "Hierarchical" structures. In this case, disputes
between units of an organization are resolved by fiat (i.e., by an authoritative decision
from someone within the organization's chain of command).
The next figure provides illustrative examples of transactions that may be
"efficiently governed" by the governance structures along the continuum in the Figure 1.
It is important to note, however, the assumptions used by Williamson in assigning
transactions as shown. The first assumption is that buyers and suppliers intend to engage
in a relationship "on a continuing basis" (Williamson, 1985: 72). Second is that there are
numerous "potential suppliers for any given requirement" (Williamson, 1985: 72). Third,
the frequency dimension "refers strictly to buyer activity in the market" (Williamson,
1985: 72). And finally, the investment dimension (or degree of asset specificity) "refers
to the characteristics of investments made by suppliers" (Williamson, 1985: 72).
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Figure 2. Example Transactions (Williamson, 1985)
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Idiosyncratic

A Critique and Elaboration of TCE. Ring and Van de Ven are critical of
Williamson. In their analysis of governance structures, they note
Although TCE provides a sound theoretical foundation for the
exploration of market versus hierarchical mechanisms for solving
strategic dependencies, it suffers from not adequately exploring
other available governance structures, repeated transactions, the
dynamic evolution of governance and transactions, and the key
roles of trust and equity in any interorganizational relationship.
(Ring and Van de Ven, 1992:484)
Thus, while including markets and hierarchies in their elaboration of a governance
continuum, Ring and Van de Ven place emphasis on the intermediate, or "hybrid" forms.
These intermediate forms are termed "recurrent contracting" and "relational contracting"
in Table 4.
While many of the characteristics of the forms described by Ring and Van de Ven
are similar to those described by Williamson, the assumptions used by Ring and Van de
Ven differ from Williamson's. First is the assumption that "risk and trust are separable
concepts for transacting parties" (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992: 487). Second, they employ
a behavioral assumption of trustworthiness rather than opportunism. This allows them to
examine how organizations can "build trust through recurrent contracts," and how trust,
once established, can facilitate the governance of transactions involving "long-term uses
of idiosyncratic assets through relational contracts in lieu of hierarchies" (Ring and Van
de Ven, 1992:487). Finally, they assume that when organizations enter into contracts
based on trustworthiness, they are "far less constrained ex ante about the ex post contract
implications of their bounded rationality" (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992: 487).
In describing "recurrent contracts," Ring and Van de Ven note:
The terms of these exchanges tend to be certain, but some
contingencies may be left to future resolution. Temporally, the
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duration of these contracts is relatively short-term. The parties see
themselves as autonomous, legally equal, but contemplating a
more embedded relationship. They use the recurrent contracting to
explore outcomes driven by motives other than efficiency, to
experiment with safeguards, and with alternative methods for
resolving conflict. (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992: 487)
Furthermore, they state that neoclassical contract law provides support for the governance
of transactions of this form. This is consistent with Williamson and his concept of
trilateral governance (Williamson, 1985).
With respect to "relational contracts," and in contrast to "recurrent contracts,"
Ring and Van de Ven note:
As a consequence [of engaging in relations involving long-term
investments which cannot be completely specified in ex ante], the
parties to these rational contracts are exposed to a much broader
range of trading hazards than their counterparts employing either
market or hierarchical transactions experience. (Ring and Van de
Ven, 1992: 487)
Their comments that disputes are resolved through internal mechanisms and that bilateral
governance is employed are consistent with Williamson (Williamson, 1985).
Table 4 is taken from Ring and Van de Ven's work. It shows the governance
continuum and discusses the transactional characteristics typically associated with each
form of governance. In their argument, firms that have decided to outsource an activity
may choose to go from hierarchy to recurrent contracting and then to relational
contracting. In this way, a firm is able to experiment with contractual flexibility and
safeguards as it develops a relationship with the supplier and is better able to assess the
responsibility and reputation of its supplier.
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Table 4. Transaction Characteristics and Governance Forms
Forms
Discrete market
transactions

Hierarchical managerial
transactions

Recurrent contracting
transactions

Relational contracting
transactions

Nature of
exchange

One-time transfer of
property rights

On-going production &
rationing of wealth

Episodic production &
transfer of property rights

Sustained production &
transfer of property rights

Terms of
exchange

Clear, complete and
monetized, sharp in by
agreement, sharp out by
pay & performance

Certain, complete
Authority structure superior
contingent on prior
hires subordinate obeys or
performance; plans for
quits the employment
experimentation on
relationship
safeguards

Nonspecific

Idiosyncratic

Mixed

Mixed & idiosyncratic

Indefinite

Short to moderate term

Moderate to long term

Structural functional
Limited, nonunique relation
command-obedience role
Status of parties between legally equal and
relationship between
free parties
legally unequal parties

Unlimited, unique relation
between legally free and
equal parties

Extensive, unique socialembedded relation
between legally equal and
free parties

Mechanisms for External market norms and Internal conflict resolution
by fiat& authority
dispute resolution societal legal systems

Endogenous designed by
Norms of equity &
reciprocity & societal legal the parties & based on
trust
systems

Relevant contract
Classical contract
law&
Governance Market
structure

Neoclassical contract
Market

Distinguishing
Characteristics

Transactionspecific
investment

Temporal
duration of the Simultaneous exchange
transaction

Employment contract
Unified

Uncertain, open and
incomplete; plans for
bilateral learning
safeguards & conflict
resolution

Relational contracts
Bilateral

(Ring and Van de Ven, 1992)
Applying the TCE Continuum to the DoD. In Figure 3, below, the TCE
continuum of transaction governance structures has been applied to a hypothetical range
of DoD functions.
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Figure 3. TCE and DoD Contracting (adapted from Pint and Baldwin, 1997)

This application of TCE to the DoD is helpful in that it reiterates the idea that as
the Federal Government outsources its functions, it is moving leftward along the
continuum (i.e., from Hierarchy to a Hybrid form). Thus, as part of the outsourcing
decision process, it is imperative that decision-makers consider which Hybrid governance
structure, as defined in Table 2, is most appropriate for the particular set of transaction
characteristics.

Synergy and Partnerships
The following discussion of synergy and partnerships is influenced, to a large
extent, by the TCE literature. Ring and Van de Ven's work is especially influential as a
result of their behavioral assumption of trustworthiness. From our perspective, we view
public-public partnership arrangements as situations in which a relational contracting
governance structure (as presented by Ring and Van de Ven) is likely to be present.
In any event, as the Federal Government outsources its support functions, it is
moving from a state in which those support functions are provided under a hierarchical

28

governance structure to one in which the functions are provided under some other
governance structure. As a result, the outsourcing decision-maker must be cognizant of
the issues relevant to such a transformation. This section presents some of the key issues
with which the decision-maker should be aware during the decision making process.
Synergy. A concept discussed in many strategic management courses is synergy.
Simply stated, synergy is "the concept that 2 + 2 = 5" (Wheelen and Hunger 1992:177).
It is the idea that "two or more subsystems working together to produce more than the
total of what they might produce working alone"(Griffm, 1996:50). To achieve synergy,
we need to incorporate the private sector with the public sector and in essence create a
new formula. The Federal Government has been spending a lot of time trying to
substitute private for public in the cost equation, but has not attempted to create a new
equation, per se. This new formula may unlock great potential in reducing government
costs.
What has been written about synergy mostly relates to the private sector simply
because they have been utilizing the concept for a longer time than the public sector. "It
is hoped that two businesses will be able to generate more profits together than they
could separately" (Wheelen and Hunger 1992:177). This same concept can be applied to
the Federal Government and the private sector working together with a slight twist. The
Federal Government typically does not make a profit. The Government measures its
success in terms of minimizing costs and maximizing social benefit. So, how can this
idea of synergy actually work when only one side is concerned about making a profit?
There has to be "some common thread that serves to relate them in some manner. The
point of commonality may be similar technology, customer usage, distribution,
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managerial skills, or product similarity" (Wheelen and Hunger 1992:177). Researchers
have identified four types of synergy.
1. Marketing Synergy. Common distribution channels, sales force,
and/or warehousing create synergies. A complete line of related
products increases the productivity of the sales force. Common
advertising and promotion can have multiple returns for the same
dollar spent.
2. Operating Synergy. The greater utilization of facilities and personnel,
the spreading of overhead, and large-lot purchasing create operating
synergies.
3. Investment Synergy. The joint use of plant, common raw materials
inventories, transfer of R&D among products, common tooling and
machinery, and increased access to sources of capital create
investment synergies.
4. Management Synergy. Since competent management is often a scarce
commodity, the addition of new products or businesses can enhance
overall performance if management finds the new problems to be
similar to the ones it has successfully overcome earlier with its current
products or businesses. (Wheelen and Hunger 1992:241)
These synergies are not automatic. In order to achieve them, a corporation and/or
government must develop an implementation program reorganizing and combining its
operations. Part of this program entails having the two separate entities form a
partnership. "There are many types of strategic alliances, ranging from simple
cooperation to full equity ownership, representing trade-offs between flexibility and longterm commitment (Pint and Baldwin, 1997: 29).
Partnerships. By looking at what local governments do, it may help the Federal
government meet its need to shrink the infrastructure cost while maintaining mission
capability. This new way of doing things is referred to as public-private partnerships.
"These public-private partnerships, whether formal or informal, are designed to identify
and pursue community goals for mutual benefit" (Holland, 1982:36).
There are several origins to the development of public-private
partnerships around the country: First, all levels of government are
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buckling under the pressure of spiraling costs for services and the
diminution of financial resources. Second, the private sector is
realizing its economic vitality of the government jurisdiction in
which it is located and the effectiveness of the public services
provided. Third, government and business are recognizing the
potency of combining public and private resources to advance
mutual interests. Government and private industry are creating
partnerships of cooperation to meet the challenges of the '90s and
beyond. It is no exaggeration to say that crucial quality-of-life
issues will require public-private partnerships in economic as well
as other areas. In fact, many of the recent successes seen in cities
across the US are directly attributable to government and business
leaders joining hands and pooling resources. (Monteilh and
Tremayne, 1990:43)
"Experience has shown that, when non-governmental institutions become partners
with public agencies, they can sometimes accomplish things that have proved difficult for
governments to do alone" (Kingsley and Gibson, 1998:11). An example of this occurred
in Los Angeles County. In order to improve service, Los Angeles County contracted
with a non-government "lead agency to monitor and care for troubled families in a given
neighborhood. The non-governmental group may be a church, community association of
other entity" (Kingsley and Gibson, 1998:11). This example shows that it is possible for
governmental entities to provide their constituents with services via outsourcing to other
than private, or for-profit, entities.
Table 5 lists several criteria that are believed to be necessary for successful
partnerships.
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Table 5. Eight Criteria for Successful Partnerships
Criteria

Example

Individual Excellence

Both partners are stong and have something of value to contribute to
the relationshop. Their motives for entering into the relationship are
positive (to pursue future opportunities), not negative (to mask
weaknesses or escape a difficult situation).

Importance

The relationship fits the major strategic objectives of the partners, so
they want to make it work Partners have long-term goals in which
the relationship plays a key role.
The partners need each other. They have complementary assets and
skills. Neither can accomplish alone what both can together.
The partners invest in each other (for example, through equity swaps,
cross-ownership, or mutual board service) to demonstrate their
respective stakes in the relationship and each other. They show
tangible signs of long-term commitment by devoting financial
resources.

Interdependence
Investment

Intbrmation

Communication is reasonably open. Partners share information
required to make the relationship work, including their objectives and
goals, technical data, and knowledge of conflicts, trouble spots, or
changing situations.

Integration

The partners develop linkages and shared ways of operating so they
can work together smoothly. They build broad connections between
many people at many organizational levels. Partners become both
teachers and learners.

Institutionalization

The relationship is given formal status, with clear responsibilities and
decision processes. It extends beyond the particular people who
formed it, and it cannot be broken on a whim.
The partners behave toward each other in honorable ways that justify
and enhance mutual trust. They do not abuse the information they
gain, nor do they undermine each other.

Integrity

(Harvard Business Review: 1994)
There are some challenges to establishing a productive partnership, however.
"Contractors who are hired as partners to solve business problems must find on the other
side customers who understand the fundamental nature of the problems being solved and
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how most efficiently to use the solutions being provided" (Andelman, 1996:38). Stephen
Smith, managing partner of the federal government practice for Andersen Consulting
states, "We need to arrive at a true alignment of interests. We need a process that forms a
business alliance versus an adversarial relationship. By sharing risk and reward, we are
no longer in an adversarial or contractual relationship. We can add value to the client, to
the government" (Andelman, 1996:38).
The central challenge for the public service is to become very good
at finding the appropriate champions and intermediaries; to work
with them and build their capability to perform their part of the
job; and to manage the relationships and support these
intermediaries effectively through using the best practice skills
associated with successful operation of boards of non-profit
organizations. (Andersen, 1996:19)
Many partnerships can be categorized as buyer/supplier relationships. This is
where one party buys or offers to buy a good or service and another party supplies for
sale a good or service. Pint and Baldwin discuss Susan Helper's division of
buyer/supplier relationships into the categories of "exit" and "voice." These categories
are based upon the buyer's response to problems as they arise and affect the relationship.
A buyer is said to use "Exit" strategy when its response is to end the relationship and
seek other partners. The use of "Voice" strategy applies when the buyer's response is to
work with the supplier in remedying the situation (Pint and Baldwin, 1997: 52).
According to Pint and Baldwin, the Air Force predominantly uses "Exit" strategy in its
relations with support services contractors (Pint and Baldwin, 1997: 54). In order to
facilitate long term partnerships similar to a public-public partnership the buyer needs to
implement more of a "Voice" strategy. When two parties enter into this type of
arrangement there has to be a commitment to keeping the agreement alive and not
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severing the agreement at the end of the initial term. Public-public partnerships are
unique in the fact that both parties are locked into a monopolist/monosoponist situation
where there is only one buyer and one supplier. This situation clearly delineates the
Federal Government's option to seek competition or sever the arrangement at the end of
the initial term and seek out another supplier.
There are times when a long-term partnership may not be advantageous to the
Federal Government. Pint and Baldwin note that strategic alliances may not be warranted
for a number of reasons. One is the cost of alliances related to 1) coordination between
organizations, 2) opportunity costs, and 3) loss of strategic flexibility. Another concern is
the risk of collaboration associated with opportunism and knowledge leaks. Yet another
concern is that perceptions of fairness may limit the Government's ability to effect
exclusive long-term relationships (Pint and Baldwin, 1997: 30). The first four concerns
would all need to be addressed utilizing TCE and determining if the costs of forming a
public-public partnership are worth the benefits derived. The last argument regarding the
perceptions of fairness would need to be addressed up-front in determining if the function
considered for a public-public partnership is inherently a Government function (Federal
or other). If the function is inherently Governmental, the perception of fairness is
immaterial. Only a Government agency can perform the function and therefore it must
remain with a Governmental body. However, if the analysis in determining whether a
function is inherently Governmental is suspect, then issues of fairness would arise from
the private sector as to why they were not allowed to compete for providing the service.
For this reason alone, it may be useful to form public-public partnerships when the
function is identified as an inherently Governmental function.

34

Current Outsourcing Models
The discussion, thus far, has provided a theoretical foundation for the outsourcing
decisions made by private-sector executives and Government officials. Keeping the
contributions of TCE in mind, as well as the literature on strategic alliances and the
guidance offered by the A-76 Circular, we now turn to an examination of the outsourcing
decision models currently available to Government agencies. We begin with the
"traditional model," and then a modified model prepared by researchers at RAND.
Figure 4 depicts the "traditional model" of DoD outsourcing decisions. The
definitions of core and non-core are taken from the A-76 definitions table above. A point
of clarification is necessary with respect to the table's use of the terms "private" and
"public." As used therein, the term "private" refers to a decision to outsource an activity
to a private-sector commercial firm. The term "public" refers to a decision to retain the
activity in-house. It does not refer, in any way, to a decision regarding the establishment
of a public-public partnership.

Core
DoD
activities

^^Private
^^^^

^-Noncore
Public

Figure 4. The DoD's "Traditional" Outsourcing Approach (Camm, 1996: 3)
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A RAND study, conducted at the request of the Commission on Roles and
Missions of the Armed Forces, created by Congress in 1993, found several faults with the
"traditional model" in Figure 4. The study's authors noted
Three aspects of this approach give us pause:
(1) The simplified presumption in favor of a private source limits any
effort to weigh the costs and benefits of public and private sources
for any particular support service. As long as an activity is not
inherently governmental, we presumably want to have it produced
in the most cost-effective manner possible.
(2) The approach gives limited attention to the difficulties that must be
overcome to maintain an effective contractual relationship with a
private-sector source.
(3) The third aspect of the Commission approach that concerns us is
the limited attention it gives to factors that should be considered to
ensure successful implementation of any proposed outsourcing. To
the contrary, the Commission implicitly promotes a rapid program
of outsourcing services that could lead to early failures. That is, if
DoD pursues extensive, expanded outsourcing without giving such
factors adequate attention, it could fail to realize its expectations
about improved performance and reduced costs. (Camm, 1996: 35)
Arguing for an alternative outsourcing decision model, the authors state, in part, that "In
contrast, this report explicitly uses cost-effectiveness as a basis for asking which DoD
support services should be outsourced" (Camm, 1996: 4). The alternative model
developed by the study's authors is shown in Figure 5.
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Figure 5. An Alternative Outsourcing Approach (Camm, 1996: 6)
With respect to concerns of the key decision makers, Camm addresses the
following: 1) concerns about negative economic effects, 2) concerns about fraud and
abuse associated with contracting, and 3) concerns about predictable support during a
contingency. In his discussion related to contingency support, Camm addresses 1) realtime control, 2) surge capability, and 3) production of services in a combat zone (Camm,
1996: 9-23).
With respect to cost effectiveness and the availability of appropriate contractual
vehicles, Camm draws from extensive empirical literature on private sector outsourcing.
He argues the following six issues should be considered as part of the cost effectiveness
decision: 1) real-time control and coordination, 2) joint use of customized assets, 3)
difficulty specifying requirements, 4) developing knowledge to oversee outsourced
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workload, 5) access to external information, and 6) direct, continuing competition
between contract and organic sources (Camm, 1996: 25-36).
While the alternative model developed by the RAND study is an improvement
upon the "traditional model" employed by DoD, it too has serious limitations. First, the
study's authors admittedly make "no prior judgement about the inherent governmental
nature of an activity" (Camm, 1996: 4). Second, the study's authors note that one
drawback in the "traditional model" is its failure to allow for consideration of outsourcing
to public sources. However, in support of their alternative model, they state that
it considers attributes of both the source of a support service and
the 'governance' structure that any DoD activity buying this
service uses to get access to it: a direct command-and-control link
when the DoD buyer 'owns' the seller within an armed service; a
memorandum of agreement when the buyer and seller lie in
different parts of the DoD; or a governmental contract when the
seller is a private firm. (Camm, 1996: 4)
Since they fail to mention any governance structure applicable to an outsourcing
arrangement with a public source, it is questionable whether they give this possibility an
adequate amount of consideration.

Our Proposed Decision Model
The literature review has, thus far, presented outsourcing theory (from a TCE
perspective), discussed issues related to partnering (from a strategic alliance perspective),
and examined current Government guidance, as well as decision models available to
Government agencies pursuing alternatives to reduce operating costs via outsourcing. A
key element throughout the discussion has been the notion that "government is and will
always be ultimately responsible for the delivery of 'public-related' services"
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(Thompson, 1998: 90). Keeping this in mind, we believe the existing literature related to
outsourcing can be used to develop a decision model that explicitly allows for the
possibility of a public-public outsourcing arrangement.
The idea of public-public outsourcing arrangements is not new - at least not at
the state and local levels of government. At these levels of government, decision makers
have used public-public partnerships as an alternative method of service delivery for
some time. They have realized that with respect to certain governmental functions,
traditional public-private outsourcing arrangements are undesirable. Furthermore, they
realize traditional public-private decision models fail to capture potential benefits
available from public-public arrangements. It has been said that
Contracting out needs to be considered whenever the government
entity cannot take advantage of the economies of scale or
scope....An important caveat is that contracting out does not
necessarily imply outsourcing to the private sector. A large public
sector entity can achieve scale and scope economies just as easily
as a privately owned firm. That is one reason why the Los Angeles
County Sheriff serves about half of the cities in Los Angeles
County. (Prager, 1994: 180)
As a result of the successful public-public partnerships experienced by many state
and local governments, the Federal Government (e.g., DoD) is now looking to these
relationships as a way of reducing its support costs. However, as we found in our review
of the extant literature, no decision model currently exists which explicitly allows for (or
addresses in detail) this type of decision. We concur with the sentiments expressed by
Prager and Desai who wrote that "Contracting out, if implemented thoughtfully and on
the basis of the appropriate model and relevant data, can yield short-run savings as well
as longer-term improvements" (1996: 185). Thus, we hope that our proposed publicpublic decision model will be appropriate, and valuable, to DoD decision makers
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searching for innovative and realistic alternatives of reducing costs, while simultaneously
charged with protecting the public interest and maintaining a core combative capability.
Filling the Gap. Figure 6 captures the essential elements of both the "traditional"
DoD outsourcing model and the improved RAND model. The matrix goes a step further
than previous models, however, by explicitly considering the inherently governmental
dimension in terms of the level of Government by which a particular function can, or
must, be performed. One assumption, implicit to the matrix but explicitly recognized in
the decision-tree model, is that in order for the public-public partnership to be considered,
there must be an adequate degree of function similarity between each of the parties.
Figure 6 can be divided into a top and bottom half according to whether a
function is deemed to be inherently governmental. It can also be divided into a left and
right half according to whether the function is deemed to be a core (i.e., military
essential) function. If a function is considered to be both inherently governmental and
core, then its provision must be executed by the Federal Government (e.g., the DoD). If
the function is not considered to be inherently governmental, yet is deemed to be
essential (i.e., critical) to the accomplishment of the military mission, then it should not
be considered for outsourcing (to either another level of government or to the private
sector).
The outsourcing decision is more complex when a service is not considered to be
a core function. In this scenario, the outsourcing decision is further complicated by the
need to evaluate the transaction costs associated with transferring the activity to an
outside entity. The acronym TCA stands for Transaction Cost Analysis.
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If a function is not inherently governmental and is not a core function, then a
decision-maker may follow the OMB Circular A-76 outsourcing guidance. According to
this guidance, if it is cost-effective (i.e., a cost analysis returns a favorable TCA result)
then the function is outsourced to the private sector firm with the proposal representing
the best value to the DoD. If, on the other hand, an unfavorable TCA results, the function
is retained, and provided for, in-house.
If a function is inherently governmental but is not core, an unfavorable TCA
would lead to the same conclusion as that arrived at under the A-76 process (i.e., the
function is retained, and provided for, in-house). However, if a favorable TCA results,
then it is believed that a public-public partnership should be pursued. Again, since the
function is considered to be inherently governmental, but has been determined to be not
core, it is assumed that it is feasible for any form of government to provide the function
for the Federal Government (e.g., DoD).
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Figure 6. The Public-Public Outsourcing Decision Model Matrix
Decision Model Criteria. Figure 7 presents the public-public outsourcing decision
model developed by the authors of this research effort. The first step is to make a
decision concerning the degree to which the function is inherently governmental.

41

Guidance and policy, related to this step in the model, is available from the FAR, the
OFPP Policy Letter 92-1, the OMB Circular A-76 and its Revised Supplemental
Handbook, and the AFLMA Outsourcing Guide for Contracting.
The next step is where the model differs most from those discussed in the
previous sections. Typically, once the decision is made that a function is inherently
governmental, the outsourcing process goes no further. In this model, the decision-maker
is required to go beyond this initial, and sometimes cursory, assessment. An analysis
must be done to identify whether the function is one that must be performed exclusively
by the Federal Government, or the DoD. Essentially, the decision-maker must ask, "Can
this function be performed by another level of Government?" If the function is deemed to
be inherently governmental, but is not one that must be performed exclusively by the
Federal Government or DoD, then the decision-maker should consider the possibility of
outsourcing the function to another level of Government.
Once it has been decided that a function can be outsourced to another level of
Government, the process cannot continue unless there is an adequate level of function
similarity. In other words, whereas the previous decision asked, "Can it be done by
another level of Government?", this step poses the question, "Is it currently being done
by another governmental entity within or below the Federal level?" Our assumption in
this step of the model is that the Federal Government would not take any further
outsourcing actions if a particular function which it was interested in outsourcing was not
already being provided, to some degree, by the alternative governmental entity.
The next step in the process requires the decision-maker to ask, "Can the
alternative governmental entity perform the function for the Federal Government in
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addition to fulfilling its own service obligations to its primary constituents?" In effect, the
decision-maker must be assured that the state or local Government has the ability and a
need to provide the service, or the ability and a willingness to enter into an arrangement
with the Federal Government. Taking from TCE, it is in this step that the decision-maker
must consider whether the alternative governmental entity has an adequate amount of
assets to provide the outsourced function to the Federal Government (at the same or
higher level of service). If not, then the decision-maker may consider other arrangements
whereby the Federal Government contributes specific assets in order to close the deal and
enhance the arrangement's chances for success.
The final step in the decision process is to conduct a comprehensive cost-benefit
analysis. We use the term comprehensive to distinguish this step from the typical costbenefit analyses that have been performed in the past during public-private outsourcing
competitions. The key difference is that the decision-maker must consider all of the costs
of the potential outsourcing arrangement. Thus, those costs identified by TCE and
Agency Theory as being attributable to the transaction characteristics are explicitly
considered (e.g., asset specificity, monitoring, and safeguards). Furthermore, the strategic
costs of entering into a strategic partnership need be considered.
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Figure 7. A Conceptual Public-Public Outsourcing Model
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Summary
This chapter has provided a basis of knowledge from which the investigative
questions can be answered. The chapter covered outsourcing fundamentals including the
objectives of outsourcing along with the advantages and disadvantages of outsourcing
functions once provided internally. Current outsourcing guidance available to DoD
outsourcing decision-makers was also presented. The discussion addressed the
government's responsibility to protect the public interest, and then addressed the scope
of, and concerns related to, the OMB Circular A-76.
The chapter's focus then moved to transaction cost and partnership issues which
should be of concern to decision-makers during the outsourcing decision process. A
review of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory was presented along with a critique
and elaboration of the theory. A brief discussion of how these theories may be applied to
DoD outsourcing decisions was then presented. Following the discussion on the
application of the TCE theory to the DoD was a discussion on synergy and partnerships
that result from outsourcing arrangements.
The remainder of the chapter investigated current outsourcing decision models.
Two outsourcing decision models were identified along with the limitations placed upon
decision-makers by the models. The chapter concludes with a conceptual decision model
intuitively derived from an examination of the literature. The conceptual model includes
the decisions that one must consider when contemplating a public-public outsourcing
arrangement.
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Ill Methodology
Chapter Overview
This chapter begins by exploring the research methodologies available for
conducting the analysis in Chapter 4. Following this, an abbreviated literature review
will lend support to our selection of a particular strategy. A discussion of case study
research is then presented. This discussion includes a section on case study designs. Our
rationale for selecting Brooks AFB as our case will be provided throughout the sections
of this chapter.

Strategy Selection
The following table provides a foundation with which to select an appropriate
research methodology.

Table 6. Relevant Situations for Different Research Strategies

Strategy
Experiment

Form of
Research
Question
how, why

Requires
Control Over
Behavioral
Events?

Focuses on
Contemporary
Events?

yes

no

Survey

who, what,* where,
how many,
how much

no

yes

Archival analysis
(e.g., economic
study)

who, what,* where,
how many,
how much

no

yes/no

History

how, why

no

no

Case Study

how, why
no
yes
'What" questions, when asked as part of an exploratory study, pertain to all five strategies
(adapted from Yin, 1994: 6)
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The form of the research question is "how"(i.e., How can the DoD maintain mission
effectiveness while reducing infrastructure costs). By this construct alone, the researcher
can eliminate the survey strategy and the archival analysis strategy. This question does
not require control over behavioral events, thus eliminating the experiment strategy. The
question focuses on a contemporary event, allowing elimination of the history strategy.
By determining the form of the research question and answering the questions regarding
control of behavioral events and the focus on contemporary events, the strategy should be
the case study approach.

Supportive Literature
Many scientists ingrained in the tools of quantitative analysis have considered
case study research suspect. This section provides a brief literature review to aid in
providing credibility to conducting case study research when appropriate.
Qualitative Research. According to Strauss and Corbin, there are three major
types of qualitative researchers. The first group believes that data should not be
analyzed; the second group is concerned with accurate description; and the third group
promotes building theory.
Some researchers believe that data should not be analyzed, per se;
but rather the researcher's task is to gather the data and present
them in such a manner that "the informants speak for themselves."
The aim is to give an honest account with little or no interpretation
of- interference with - those spoken works or of the observations
made by the researcher. In this perspective, the researcher's
scholarly obligation is to hear and report, somewhat akin to a
journalist
Other qualitative researchers are concerned with accurate
description, when doing their analysis and presenting their
findings. Because the investigator cannot possibly present all the
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data en toto to the readers, it is necessary to reduce these data. The
principle here is to present an accurate description of what is being
studied
Still other investigators are concerned with building theory. They
believe that the development of theoretically informed
interpretations is the most powerful way to bring reality to light.
Researchers concerned with building theory also believe that
theories represent the most systematic way of building,
synthesizing, and integrating scientific knowledge. (Strauss and
Corbin, 1990:21)
Our efforts are clearly not concerned with building theory. However, they could
be described as either one of the other two types. We are concerned with providing an
accurate description of the Brooks AFB outsourcing decision process since it is our aim
to compare the conceptual outsourcing decision model (developed in Chapter 2) with that
of Brooks AFB. However, one should not confuse our attempt to compare the conceptual
model to the Brooks AFB initiative as an effort to analyze the Brooks AFB initiative. To
justly analyze the Brooks AFB initiative would require much more time and effort, and is
beyond the scope of our particular research purpose.
Secondary Research. This research endeavor relies upon the use of secondary
information. The primary source of information is a final draft and implementation
report outlining the "Brooks Model." There is no true experiment to receive data from as
of today or for some years to come. Data will be provided for years as the "Brooks
Model" is implemented, analyzed, and continues to evolve. If the data proves to be
conclusive and in the best interest of the DoD, it is likely the "Brooks Model" will be
implemented at other DoD locations as deemed feasible.
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In research, there are inherent advantages and disadvantages in using various
approaches to conducting the research. The utilization of secondary sources is no
different.
The more significant of these advantages are related to time and
cost. In general, it is much less expensive to use secondary data
than it is to conduct a primary research investigation. This is true
even where there are costs associated with obtaining the secondary
data. When answers to questions are required quickly, the only
practical alternative is to consult secondary sources. Secondary
sources provide a useful starting point for additional research by
suggesting problem formulations, research hypotheses, and
research methods. Consultation of secondary sources provides a
means for increasing efficiency of the research dollar by targeting
real gaps and oversights in knowledge. Secondary data also
provide a useful comparative tool. New data may be compared to
existing data for purposes of examining differences or trends.
(Stewart, 1984:14)
However, whenever a research approach purports to have some type of advantage over
another approach, it likewise yields some type of disadvantage. One hopes the
advantages obtained outweigh the disadvantages incurred.
Secondary sources are not without problems. As in primary
research, the design or conclusions may be flawed. Data are often
collected with a specific purpose in mind, a purpose that may
produce deliberate or unintentional bias. Thus, secondary sources
must be evaluated carefully. The fact that secondary data were
collected originally for particular purposes may produce other
problems. Category definitions, particular measures, or treatment
effects may not be the most appropriate for the purpose at hand.
Seldom are secondary data available at the individual-observation
level. This means that the data are aggregated in some form, and
the unit of aggregation may be inappropriate for a particular
purpose. Finally, secondary data are, by definition, old data. Thus
the data may not be particularly timely for some purposes.
(Stewart, 1984:14)
Case Study Research. The first concept that needs to be addressed is "what is
case study research?" A case study is an empirical inquiry that

49

-

investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life
context; when
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly
evident; and in which
multiple sources of evidence are used. (Yin, 1989:23)

Our research meets this definition in that our efforts are designed to investigate the
contemporary phenomenon known as public-public outsourcing partnerships (especially
with respect to the Federal Government and the DoD). The "real-life context" is provided
by the Brooks AFB initiative to outsource some of the base support functions to the City
of San Antonio, Texas.
With respect to the blurring of boundaries between phenomenon and context,
"you would use the case study method because you deliberately wanted to cover
contextual conditions—believing that they might be highly pertinent to your phenomenon
of study" (Yin, 1994: 13). In our case, we believe the Brooks AFB initiative will provide
pertinent information to the phenomenon of public-public partnerships and, thus, will be
of great value to us in developing an analytical outsourcing decision model for use by
decision-makers contemplating such arrangements in the future.
One limitation is that we do not have multiple sources of evidence to draw upon
in comparing our conceptual model to the Brooks AFB initiative. The "AFMC Special
Study for Brooks Air Force Base" was the only evidence used for the case study. We
believed the report was satisfactorily comprehensive for our research purpose.
The next logical question to answer is "what are some applications of case study
research?" Yin informs us there are at least four different applications for case studies.
The most important is to explain the causal links in real-life
interventions that are too complex for the survey or experimental
strategies. A second application is to describe the real-life context
in which an intervention has occurred. Third, an evaluation can
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benefit, again in a descriptive mode, from an illustrative case study
- even a journalistic account - of the intervention itself. Finally,
the case study strategy may be used to explore those situations in
which the intervention being evaluated has no clear, single set of
outcomes. (Yin, 1989:25)
Our effort here is not directly addressed by Yin. A case study is, nevertheless, appropriate
since we are using the Brooks AFB initiative to explore the phenomenon of public-public
outsourcing and the decision processes related to the phenomenon.
Case-Study Designs. There will be four types of case study designs addressed in
this section, as depicted in Figure 8.
S ing le-C ase D esig n s

Multiple-Case Designs

H olistic
(sin g le u n it
of a n a lysis)

TYPE 1

TYPE 3

Em bedded
(m u Itiple u n its
of a n a lysis)

TYPE 2

TYPE 4

Figure 8. Basic Types of Designs for Case Studies (Yin, 1989:46)
A primary distinction in designing case studies is between single- and multiple
case designs. Multiple-case, as the name implies, is a case study approach that contains
more than a single case being analyzed. "A common example is a study of school
innovations (such as open classrooms, teacher aides, or new technology), in which
independent innovations occur at different sites" (Yin, 1989:52). Each site may be
considered a subject of an individual case study, and the study as a whole would have
used a multiple-case design. A primary advantage of the multiple-case study is that the
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evidence is often considered more compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded
as being more robust. While this approach may be compelling, the rationale for singlecase designs cannot usually be satisfied by multiple cases.
Single-case studies, as the name implies, is a case study approach which contains
a single case being analyzed. There are three compelling circumstances in which a
single-case approach is most appropriate. The first circumstance is according to Yin is
when it represents the critical case in testing a well-formulated theory. A single case may
be able to confirm, challenge, or extend the theory, there may exist a single case, meeting
all the conditions for testing the theory. The single case approach can be used to
determine whether a "theory's propositions are correct, or whether some alternative set of
explanations might be more relevant" (Yin, 1989:47). The second circumstance,
according to Yin, is where the case represents an extreme or unique case. This has been
commonly utilized in clinical psychology, where a specific injury or disorder may be so
rare that any single case is worth documenting and analyzing. A third circumstance is
what Yin refers to as the revelatory case. This situation exists when an investigator has
an opportunity to observe and analyze a phenomenon previously inaccessible to scientific
investigation. There are other situations in which the single case may be conducted as a
prelude to further study, such as the use of case studies as exploratory devices or such as
the conduct of a pilot case that is the first of a multiple-case study. However, in these
situations the single-case study approach cannot be regarded as its own complete case
study; it is merely a part of a larger endeavor.
Yin states that the greatest threat to single-case study designs is the potential
vulnerability that a case may later turn out not to be the case it was thought to be at the
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outset. Single-case designs require careful investigation of the potential case to minimize
the chances of misrepresentations and to maximize the access needed to collect the case
study evidence.
In addition to the distinction between the Single-Case vs. Multiple-Case Designs,
the Holistic vs. Embedded Analysis must also be examined. Both case study designs
offer two different approaches to conducting analysis. A holistic approach is utilized
when there is only one unit of analysis. "The holistic design is advantageous when no
logical subunits can be identified and when the relevant theory underlying the case study
is itself of a holistic nature" (Yin, 1989:49). However, this approach may yield its own
set of problems. According to Yin, a typical problem with the holistic design is that the
entire case study may be conducted at an abstract level, lacking any clear measures or
data. Another problem with this form of analysis is that the entire nature of the case
study may shift. Yin states that, the initial study questions may have reflected one
orientation, but as the case study proceeds, a different orientation may emerge, and the
evidence begins to address different questions. Some people have argued that such
"flexibility is a strength of the case study approach. In fact the largest criticism of case
studies is based on this type of shift - in which the original design is no longer
appropriate for the research questions being asked" (Yin, 1989:50). One way to
overcome this criticism is to utilize the embedded design.
The embedded design may involve more than one unit or sub-unit of analysis.
Yin provides an example that even though a case study might be about a single public
program, the analysis might include outcomes from individual projects within the
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program. He further warns that a major pitfall "occurs when the case study focuses only
on the subunit level and fails to return to the larger unit of analysis" (Yin, 1989:50).

Selected Approach
A single-case holistic study approach appears to be feasible at this point given the
Brooks AFB initiative is a unique approach. We will examine the Brooks AFB initiative
and compare the decision process to the public-public outsourcing decision model
portrayed in Figure 7. Yin has articulated that the Type I approach is, generally, the least
compelling and that Type IV is the most compelling. Types II and III each have their
good points and bad points. Due to the uniqueness of the research involved, Type I
appears to be the best fit for this thesis. Before dismissing the validity of the Type I
approach, however, it is important to remember that researchers should choose a
methodology appropriate for the research being conducted—not to make the research
"fit" the methodology.
The single-holistic case-study approach appears to be the best fit for the
exploration of the decision models relied upon by the DoD to implement the publicpublic partnership phenomenon.
While case studies do not fit every research situation, they have
much greater applicability than previously believed. Excellent
opportunity exists for using case study research methodology in
many areas of logistics and purchasing. Some of these areas
include:
1. Understanding the impact of various types of logistics and
purchasing organizational structures on the role of logistics in
an organization.
2. Understanding the decision-making process related to:
a. Whether or not an organization outsources logistics
activities.
b. The degree of outsourcing pursued. (Ellram, 1996:115)
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Thus, in arguing that a single-holistic case-study is appropriate for our research purpose,
we rely upon Ellram, and the points made by her in 2a and 2b above.
Furthermore, we believe a single, albeit holistic, case study is sufficient for
initially testing the conceptual public-public outsourcing decision model developed in
Chapter 2. We rely on the fact that the model developed is only a slight adaptation of the
current models used for public-private outsourcing decisions, and that these models have
proven useful to decision-makers in such situations. A model's strength ultimately
depends upon its generalization power derived from its application to multiple cases.
However, given that public-public outsourcing arrangements are a new idea to the DoD,
we believe it will be insightful to investigate the usefulness of the model developed in
Chapter 2 based upon its application to the Brooks AFB initiative.
Summary
This chapter began by exploring the research methodologies available for
conducting the comparison in Chapter 4. Following this, an abbreviated literature review
was presented which lends support to our selection of the single-holistic case-study
strategy. A discussion of case study research was then presented. This discussion
included a section on case study designs. Particular emphasis was placed upon the singleholistic case-study design. Throughout the sections of this chapter, our rationale for
selecting the Brooks AFB initiative as our case was discussed and supported.
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IV. Case Study Results and Analysis
Chapter Overview
This chapter is divided into two main sections. First, an overview of the case
which we have chosen for our research purpose is presented. This overview includes a
discussion of the impetus behind the Brooks AFB initiative, and the objectives of the
study which was conducted as part of the initiative. The approach used by the authors of
the study is also presented. Second, our comparison of the conceptual model developed in
Chapter 2 with the decision process followed in the Brooks AFB initiative is presented.
The conceptual model is shown, again, at the beginning of the section to aid the reader in
following the comparison.
Case Overview
Flight operations ended at Brooks AFB in 1961 (SAIC, 1999: 2-1). After the 1992
merger of Air Force Systems Command and Air Force Logistics Command, Brooks AFB
became home to the Human Systems Center (SAIC, 1999: 2-1). As such, it fell under the
control of the newly formed Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC). Today, the Human
Systems Center is known as the Human Systems Wing, and is directly assigned to
AFMC's Aeronautical Systems Center.
Brooks AFB resides upon 1,310 acres within the greater City of San Antonio.
There are 265 buildings on the premises, including 95 military family housing units.
These structures encompass over 2.2 million square feet of floor space. The base is also
responsible for more than 43 miles of road, and 175 miles of utilities (SAIC, 1999: 2-2).
The impact of Brooks AFB on the community of San Antonio is significant.
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The economic impacts are direct (i.e., job creation, purchase or
goods and services), indirect (i.e., salaries of both civilians and
military personnel are spent within the community, generating tax
revenue), and induced (i.e., spending and re-spending of dollars in
the community. (SAIC, 1999: 2-4)
Brooks AFB, along with the other bases in the San Antonio area, supports over 168,000
military and civilians. Direct and indirect economic impacts of Brooks AFB are estimated
to be $165 million and $118 million, respectively (SAIC, 1999: 2-4). As a result of these
impacts the base has on the local community, any effort to reduce operation and support
costs in order to maintain the future viability of the base is warranted and deserves
attention.
Impetus and Objectives. The "AFMC Special Study for Brooks Air Force Base"
was published on January 29,1999. The report was prepared, under contract, by Science
Applications International Corporation (SAIC), upon "a request by Congress and
direction by the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) through the Air Force Material
Command (AFMC)" (SAIC, 1999: 1-1). The study's purpose was to identify and
recommend alternatives that would "substantially reduce base operating costs at Brooks
Air Force Base" (SAIC, 1999: 1-1). Accordingly, the study is focused on the following
SECAF objectives
1. Describe any barriers (including barriers under law and through
policy) to improved infrastructure management.
2. Describe means of reducing infrastructure management costs
through cost-sharing arrangements and more cost-effective
utilization of property.
3. Describe potential public partnerships or public-private
partnerships to enhance management and operations.
4. Assess potential for expanding infrastructure management
opportunities at Brooks AFB resulting from initiatives considered
at the base or at other installations.
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5. Analyze current and projected costs of the ownership or lease of
Brooks AFB under a variety of ownership or leasing scenarios,
including the savings that would accrue to the United States Air
Force (USAF) under such scenarios.
Approach. The approach taken by SAIC was to first establish baseline costs for a
wide variety of functional areas and services (see Table 7 for a complete listing). SAIC
then developed, and analyzed, several alternatives aimed at reducing Brooks AFB
operating costs.
Table 7. Brooks AFB Functions Considered in SAIC Study
AREA
Municipal Services

Transportation Services
Information Technology
Services
Housing Services

Health Services
Food Services
Utilities Services

Supply Services

Financial Management

FUNCTIONS
Waste Management
Grounds/Road Maintenance
Fire Services
Law Enforcement
Transportation Flight services
311th Communications Squadron services
Military Family Housing
Brooks Inn
Brooks AFB Dormitories
311th Medical Squadron services
Lone Star Dining Facility
VvateT
Waste Water
Natural Gas
Electricity
Central Heating and Cooling
311th Logistics Squadron-Supply Flight
311th Logistics Squadron-Medical Flight
311th Civil Engineering Squadron Supply (CEMAS)
Logistics Management Control Activity
Financial Management Directorate services
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Table 7. Brooks AFB Functions Considered in SAIC Study (continued)
AREA
Human Systems Wing

FUNCTIONS
Judge Advocate
Public Affairs
Manpower & Quality Office
Contracting
Small Business Center
Environmental
Safety Office
History Office
Bowling Center
Morale, Welfare and
Child Development Center
Services
Consolidated Clubs
Family Child Care
Fitness Center
Golf Course
Information, Ticket & Tours
Library
Marketing
Outdoor Recreation
Rod & Gun Club
Skills center
Veterinary Clinic
Youth Center
Other Air Base Group Services Chapel Program
Plans and Readiness Division
Mission Support Squadron
Hangar 9 Museum
311th Civl Engineering Squadron services
Civil Engineering Services

SAIC primarily used "private sector cost accounting practices to identify the full
costs to the USAF for operating Brooks AFB" (SAIC, 1999: 1-3). Private, as well as
public, standards were used to evaluate alternatives. To the maximum extent possible, the
study addressed Quality of Life and Quality of Service issues.
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The study developed five alternatives, including its recommended approach.
These alternatives each have two distinct components: 1) Business Process
Reengineering (BPR) efforts aimed at reducing costs, and 2) real property development
efforts to generate revenues (SAIC, 1999: 1-4). As for the BPR approach related to each
alternative, the study identifies two possible options: 1) low aggressive, and 2) high
aggressive. Table 8 contains the mechanisms for change, which SAIC believes are driven
by a combination of the two components (i.e., BPR and real property efforts).
The study used six criteria to evaluate the alternatives. The metrics are listed in
the Table 9. The metrics were "combined into an overall measure of 'value' for the
purpose of rank ordering the various alternatives. This measure is defined as risk-adjusted
net present value (or economic rate of return)" (SAIC, 1999:4-6).
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Table 8. Mechanisms for Change
MECHANISM
Business Process
Reengineering

DESCRIPTION
Internal efforts to reduce the costs of operating Brooks
AFB that may require staff realignments and private
sector benchmarking to achieve the most efficient
organization possible.

Transfer of Service
Provision and Facilities to
the Community, Private
Sector, Other Military or
Government Entities

This mechanism includes transfer of service provision
responsibilities in exchange for land and/or property and
outright privatization of some services, as dictated by
benchmarking analysis.

Close facilities or eliminate services that are generating a
net loss to the base and the USAF. In some cases, this
elimination will require enhanced reliance on community
services and commercial vendors and may require some
subsidization of funds to military personnel to offset the
costs of providing these services. It may also require
provision of enhanced transportation to these services,
particularly for the student population. For the services
eliminated, the "compensatory" costs will be significantly
lower.
Outgrant Facilities, Assets This mechanism increases revenues to the owner of the
facilities, assets or land and improves the overall
or Land
utilization of capital at Brooks AFB.
Eliminate Services

Expand Services

In areas where the USAF, Brooks AFB or the City have
an opportunity to bring new business opportunities or
consolidate existing services, (e.g., fire, police,
information services, transportation), revenue or revenuein-kind will generate operating revenue or reduce the
direct cost of operating Brooks AFB.

(adapted from SAIC, 1999:4-3)
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Table 9. Evaluation Metrics
METRIC
Direct Mission Impact

DESCRIPTION
Changes in support to mission elements. In this area, the
concern is with direct impacts of a change in base
operating practices rather than indirect impacts that may
occur as a result of a change in service levels.

Net Operating Costs

Change in Brooks AFB operating costs and USAF
outlays. Net operating costs savings include any
offsetting costs involved in taking BPR land or property
development. Such costs could include any subsidies
that would need to be paid by the USAF to military
personnel to compensate for the elimination or reduction
in services.

Revenue Generation

Change in Brooks AFB/USAF and Treasury revenues.
Revenue generation occurs as a result of the disposition
of equipment or assets and lease payments from real
property. For this analysis, revenue from land and
buildings is separated from revenue gathered from
operations, the two sources of revenes are then combined
as part of an overall evaluation metric.

QÖL/QÖS

For the quality of services the study distinguishes
between what is a perceived impact and what is an actual
impact on the quality of services. Two principal factors
define this distinction; current usage levels and the
availability and access to other local services. For
example, the elimination of a program with limited
patronage compared to the total cost of the program, and
with easy community access would show little or no
quality of service impact. Where these are negative
impacts, mitigation tools are suggested. In some cases,
the increased choice of services off base may have a
positive impact on QOL despite the fact that a program is
eliminated. Potential impacts or perceived impacts are
assessed for service members, employees, tenants,
dependents, and retirees.

Community Impacts

Change in net jobs. The change in net jobs will be
negatively impacted by a reduction in the labor force
required for support services at Brooks AFB. This
negative impact will be offset in two ways. The first is a
corresponding shift (increase) in employment to the
private sector or the city. The second is through the raw
land and property development efforts that will bring new
jobs to the San Antonio community. The direct (#of jobs)
and indirect (downstream income) are measured and
presented as part of the overall results.
Probability of success, timing.

mplementation Risk

(adapted from SAIC, 1999:4-5)
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Analysis of Case
The figure below is a reproduction of the conceptual alternative outsourcing
method decision model presented originally in Chapter 2 as Figure 7. It is provided here,
again, to facilitate our analysis of the Brooks AFB initiative case.

inherently
Governmental

Commercial
Activity

STOP
Use A-76 Outsourcing
Process

FedföoD
Agency Only

Any Gov't
Form/Level

D
D

STOP
Not a Candidate

"H

STOP
Not a Candidate

(STOP
"\
Not a Candidate 1

Figure 9. A Conceptual Public-Public Outsourcing Model

63

Figure 10 is a depiction of the decision process followed in the AFMC Special
Study for Brooks Air Force Base. This process model is not explicitly presented in the
study by SAIC. However, it is an accurate portrayal of the method employed by SAIC to
achieve the study's objectives. This conceptual depiction is grounded on the fact that we
read and reviewed the study report thoroughly. In creating this model of the study's
decision process, we took from what was said throughout the report as well as from the
format in which the material was presented in the report.

Baseline
Costs

Identify Functions

Identify:
Mission Criticality
Service Similarity
Asset Availability
Implementation Barriers

Develop
Alternatives

Analyze
Alternatives

Cost-Benefit Analysis
(No consideration of
implementation barriers)

Recommendation

Consideration of implementation
barriers

Implementation
Plan

Figure 10. Graphical Model of the Brooks Initiative Decision Process
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It is important to highlight the fact that the model presented in Figure 10 is a
process or implementation model rather than a decision model. While this confounds our
attempt to directly compare our conceptual model with one used in the Brooks AFB
initiative case, the fact is that there was no clear decision model employed in the SAIC
report. We believe it is of value, however, to compare our conceptual decision model to
the process model we created based upon the content of the study report. The study's
process model addresses issues that are (and are not) addressed by our conceptual
decision model. Thus, we believe comparing the two will yield significant insights into
the decisions that should be made- as well as the process through which the decisions are
made- with respect to the phenomenon of public-public outsourcing.
What follows, then, is our analysis of the Brooks AFB initiative decision process
model as compared with the conceptual decision model developed in Chapter 2. The
structure of the analysis is such that we first discuss a major step of the initiative's
process model (e.g., Baseline Costs, Develop Alternatives, etc.), and then compare it with
the conceptual decision model. Before proceeding to the next major step in the initiative's
process model, we discuss any factors which may influence the particular step (e.g.,
having discussed and compared the major step in which costs are baselined, we then
discuss and compare the identification of functions before moving to the next major step
in the initiative's process model in which alternatives are developed).
Baseline Costs. According to the study's Executive Summary, SAIC first
established baseline costs for the functions listed in Table 7. The rationale given was
Whether alternatives include internal re-engineering, private sector
benchmarking or commercializing facilities, the appropriate basis
for evaluation is the total cost of a function, which includes a full
allocation of all infrastructure and other support expenditures.
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Brooks AFB, the USAF, DoD and potential vendors will only be
able to make 'value-based' decisions if the total costs of providing
support services are estimated. (SAIC, 1999: 3-1)
An activity-based costing methodology "was used to provide a baseline to compare
current operations against future City of San Antonio and private sector proposals"
(SAIC, 1999: 1-3).
Comparison to Figure 9. Baselining the cost of functions to be considered
for outsourcing is implicitly addressed in the decision model shown in Figure 9. The
model in Figure 9 assumes that the baseline cost of a function is calculated as part of the
comprehensive cost-benefit analysis step. Thus, whereas both the model in Figure 9 and
the process followed in the Brooks initiative include a step which requires the
establishment of a cost baseline, the sequencing of this step is different.
Identify Functions. Those functions listed in Table 7 are the ones that were
identified to be included within the scope of the SAIC study. This step implicitly (albeit,
obviously) precedes the step in which the costs associated with function are baselined.
The study does not, however, discuss how the functions were selected for
inclusion in the study. As a corollary, the study also fails to discuss why some functions
were not considered for inclusion. Thus, it is unclear whether functions were selected for
inclusion in the study, or omitted from consideration, based upon economics, politics,
policy guidance, or philosophical reasons.
Comparison to Figure 9. The model in Figure 9 does not explicitly
contain a step in which the functions to be considered for outsourcing are identified.
Instead, the model assumes that the functions to be considered have already been selected
by top-level officials, and that the decision-makers charged with developing and
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analyzing alternative courses of action will start by considering the nature of the
function(s).
Develop Alternatives. The next step in the SAIC report was the development of
alternatives representing "a series of hypothetical scenarios along a continuum" (SAIC,
1999: 4-1). These alternatives "were developed in conjunction with the Brooks AFB staff
and City of San Antonio representatives" (SAIC, 1999: 1-3).
Five alternatives were developed (including the recommended approach). In
developing each of the alternatives, the following issues were considered: Mission
Criticality, Service Similarity, Asset Availability, and Implementation Barriers.
Comparison to Figure 9. The model in Figure 9 does not contain a single
step for the development of alternatives. Rather, the development of alternatives occurs
as the decision-maker follows the steps between the determination of the nature of the
function and the performance of a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis. Therefore, we
shall first look at the Brooks initiative process model and then compare each of the
elements to the model in Figure 9.
Mission Criticality. The Executive Summary states that the alternatives
developed "contain two distinct components: Business Process Reengineering (BPR)
efforts aimed at reducing costs, and real property development efforts to generate
revenues" (SAIC, 1999: 1-4). When combined, these components "provide many
different mechanisms for change, ranging from the transfer of services to the City of San
Antonio or the private sector in exchange for real property, to the elimination of services
if they are not supporting mission critical activities" (SAIC, 1999:1-4). We infer, from
this statement, that Brooks AFB and the City actively took the issue of mission criticality
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under consideration when identifying functions to be considered, and when developing
alternatives.
Comparison to Figure 9. The model in Figure 9 provides a separate step
in which the mission criticality of a function is identified and assessed. The Brooks
initiative process model includes this as one element within the "Develop Alternatives"
step.
Services Similarity. This element within the "Develop Alternatives" step, in the
Brooks initiative process model, is one that is inferred from statements made in the
Executive Summary of the study. In discussing "Alternative 3: Base Transfer Strategy,"
the study states that
Brooks AFB relies more heavily on the City for the provision of
municipal services, real property maintenance services, and
recreation and parks services. These services are exchanged for the
proceeds from the real property and raw land development and the
retention of Brooks AFB core activities in the San Antonio
community. Remaining services (not provided by the City) are
competitively outsourced or privatized [emphasis added] with an
emphasis on local and small businesses. (SAIC, 1999: 1-6)
Apparently, "Many of the services provided by San Antonio duplicate and/or
support services currently provided by Brooks AFB" (SAIC, 1999: C-l). Therefore, "It is
expected that the City can provide these at a lower cost than the USAF currently does
through leveraging 'economies of scale'" (SAIC, 1999: 1-7).
Comparison to Figure 9. The model in Figure 9 provides a separate step in
which the service similarity of a function is identified and assessed. The Brooks initiative
process model includes this as one element within the "Develop Alternatives" step.
Asset Availability. This element within the "Develop Alternatives" step, in the
Brooks initiative process model, is discussed briefly in an appendix to the SAIC study.
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According to the study, "Consolidating theme services provides an opportunity for cost
effectiveness, through economies of scale, for both the City of San Antonio and Brooks
AFB" (SAIC, 1999: C-l). The appendix describes the City's assets, and provides details
on the community's demand for the city services, which these assets support. The
following functional areas are discussed in the appendix: Municipal Services (i.e.,
grounds/road maintenance, fire services, and law enforcement), Transportation,
Information Technology, Housing Services, Health Services, Food Services, Utilities,
Financial Management, and Arts and Cultural Affairs.
Comparison to Figure 9. The model in Figure 9 provides a separate step
in which Asset Availability is identified and assessed. The Brooks initiative process
model includes this as one element within the "Develop Alternatives" step.
Implementation Barriers. This element within the "Develop Alternatives" step in
the Brooks initiative process model aims to identify and consider "institutional,
regulatory, legal, and cultural barriers to reducing operating costs at Brooks AFB"
(SAIC, 1999: 1-3). As part of the discussion on barriers, the study states
The term 'barriers' implies a more rigid political, administrative
and legal system than is actually the case. Many 'barriers' are more
appropriately labeled 'problems' because they cause delay or
involve well-known controversies but do not prevent the desired
action from taking place eventually. (SAIC, 1999: 6-1)
The study found that many of the barriers existed at different levels (e.g.,
Congress, the Executive branch, and within the USAF). The barriers are discussed with
respect to "three principal areas: (1) BPR; (2) Facility Leasing and; (3) Raw Land
Development" (SAIC, 1999: 6-2).
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Comparison to Figure 9. The decision model in Figure 9 does not contain
a step in which the barriers to implementation of a potential public-public outsourcing
arrangement (with respect to an inherently governmental function) are considered.
Analyze Alternatives/ Cost-Benefit Analysis. The alternatives analyzed in this
step of the Brooks AFB initiative process model were "developed in conjunction with
Brooks AFB staff and City of San Antonio representatives" (SAIC, 1999:4-1).
According to the study, "The analysis approach identifies the range of potential operating
cost savings together with land and facility revenues that are available from changing the
way Brooks AFB conducts business" (SAIC, 1999: 4-1).
In this step of the process, the alternatives are analyzed without respect to the
potential implementation barriers identified in the previous step. The analysis does,
however, take into consideration Quality of Life and Quality of Service issues.
Furthermore, the analysis accounts for Direct Mission Impact as well as Community
Impact (see table 9 for definitions of these, and other, evaluation metrics).
Comparison to Figure 9. The decision model in Figure 9 also provides for
a cost-benefit analysis. However, the analysis performed as part of this step accounts for
the transaction costs associated with a particular outsourcing arrangement. Such
transaction costs include the ex ante costs of negotiating and drafting the contract, as well
as the ex post costs of monitoring and enforcement (e.g., litigation). The issues of asset
specificity and opportunism are included as well, and are closely related to the issues of
partnering and strategic organizational imperatives (e.g., the ability of the Federal
Government to cancel the public-public partnership, and return to the in-house provision
of a function). The evaluation metrics used in the SAIC study to rank order the different
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alternatives are valid, but do not address transaction or agency costs as described above
(see Chapter 2 for more on transaction and agency costs).
Recommendation/Consideration of Implementation Barriers. At this step in the
Brooks AFB initiative process model, a recommended approach for reducing base
operating costs is discussed. The analysis of the recommended approach is similar to that
performed on the other alternatives. However, it considers the barriers to implementation
as well as the risk-adjusted rates of return.
In the section of the study that addresses risk-adjusted rates of return, it is said
that "an alternative with the highest potential pay-off may not be the preferred alternative
because it involves risks that Brooks AFB, the USAF, or the City of San Antonio are
unwilling to take" (SAIC, 1999: 4-7). The risks addressed in the study include
Political, legislative, legal, institutional (i.e., ownership
considerations), cultural (i.e., long-term USAF practices), budget •
(i.e., City of San Antonio, Brooks AFB and USAF), environmental
compliance and market (i.e., availability of contractors, raw land
absorption, etc). (SAIC, 1999: 4-6)
Additionally, it is mentioned that the "risk/yield tradeoff is an integral part of the
recommended approach" (SAIC, 1999: 4-7).
Comparison to Figure 9. The decision model in Figure 9 implicitly
contains a "Recommendation" step. The nature of decision model is such that, in
response to a particular question step, two or more alternative courses of action are
followed. In the model shown in Figure 9, two recommendations are made depending
upon the result of the comprehensive cost-benefit analysis (e.g., if the result of the
comprehensive cost-benefit analysis is positive, the recommendation is to pursue a
public-public partnership). Thus, both models allow for recommendations to be made.
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Implementation Plan. In the final step of the Brooks AFB initiative process
model, two elements are present: a graphical timeline for implementing the recommended
approach, and proposed draft legislation. The timeline is based upon a phased approach
allowing for the estimated time it will take to overcome the implementation barriers
addressed in the "Recommendation" step of the process model. The proposed draft
legislation also addresses the implementation barriers to the recommended approach.
Unless - and until - this draft (or legislation similar to it) is adopted by Congress, the
Executive branch, and the USAF, the recommended approach cannot be implemented.
Comparison to Figure 9. The decision model in Figure 9 does not contain
a step in which an implementation plan is proposed. Once the comprehensive cost-benefit
analysis is completed and determined to be favorable, the recommendation is to pursue a
public-public partnership. It would be left to the decision-maker to create an
implementation plan.
Summary
This chapter provided an overview of the Brooks AFB initiative to outsource as
many support functions as practicable in order to reduce the base's operating and support
costs. The impetus and objectives of the SAIC study were discussed, as was the approach
taken by SAIC to fulfill the study's objectives.
The chapter's focus then turned to an analysis of the Brooks AFB initiative's
process model as compared to our conceptual decision model. The analysis showed that
while one is a decision model and the other is a process model, there were many
similarities (and a few differences) with respect to the issues of concern to decisionmakers considering a public-public outsourcing relationship.
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V. General Results and Analysis
Chapter Overview
This chapter presents our findings and analysese as they relate to the investigative
questions posited at the conclusion of Chapter 1. This chapter is organized by the order of
the investigative questions as they appear in Chapter 1. The discussion of each
investigative question includes our findings from the Chapter 2 literature review and th
Chapter 4 Brooks Model case study. The goal of this chapter is to objectively report our
findings and analysese, related to each investigative question. Our interpretations and
conclusions will be presented in Chapter 6.

Investigative Question 1
This question explores the range of outsourcing possibilities by asking "What
outsourcing option(s) are available to the Federal Government (e.g., the Department of
Defense)?" Our proposition is that there is at least one alternative to the traditional
method of outsourcing in which only commercial activities are considered for
performance by private sector firms.
Chapter 2 Findings. From Chapter 2, we find that there are alternatives to the
traditional cost reduction method of outsourcing only commercial activities to private
sector firms. The OMB Circular A-76 itself acknowledges that decision-makers "must
consider a wide range of options," to include, "the possible devolution of activities to
State and local governments (OMB Circular A-76 Revised Supplemental Handbook:
1996). The authors of the RAND study conducted on behalf of the Commission on Roles
and Missions of the Armed Forces (created by Congress in 1993) support the idea of
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outsourcing alternatives. They found that the DoD's traditional outsourcing approach was
based, in part, upon a preconception of efficiency that gave preference to private sources.
They argue that this unduly precluded the consideration of the merits of outsourcing
functions to public sources.
Our findings in Chapter 2 support our proposition that alternative outsourcing
arrangements exists and merit consideration by decision-makers. Whereas public-private
outsourcing arrangements have been the norm in the past, public-public outsourcing
arrangements are now being considered as a viable alternative to - or extension of- the
traditional methods employed to reduce operations and support costs. We shall now,
briefly, look to the Brooks AFB initiative and analyze its significance with respect to
Investigative Question 1.
The Brooks Initiative. The SAIC study conducted as part of the Brooks AFB
initiative provides empirical support to our proposition. The study considered a plethora
of alternatives aimed at reducing the base's operations and support costs. The alternatives
included outsourcing functions to private sector firms in the local community and to the
City of San Antonio.
Prior to the release of the SAIC report, Lt Col Michael A. White, Deputy Director
of the Business Development Office at Brooks AFB, gave a presentation related to the
Brooks AFB initiative in which it was stated that the vision of the base was to transition
to a cooperative venture between the base and the state (i.e., Texas), the city (i.e., San
Antonio), and the private sector (Human Systems Center, 1998). Therefore, it is clear
that, from the inception of the initiative, stakeholders in the cost reduction process
refused to be bound by traditional cost reduction methods (i.e., outsourcing of
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commercial activities to private sector firms). Instead, the process stakeholders willingly
entertained innovative alternatives, including the outsourcing of functions to state and
local governmental entities.

Investigative Question 2
Having identified at least two outsourcing methods (i.e., public-private and
public-public), this question asks "Under what circumstances can or should the different
outsourcing options be considered?" Our proposition is that public-private outsourcing is
appropriate and should be considered when the function in question is not inherently
governmental and is not a "core" activity (i.e., a national defense activity or a military
essential function). Public-public outsourcing, we propose, is appropriate and should be
considered when the function in question is inherently governmental but is not a "core"
activity.
Chapter 2 Findings. The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 supports the notion that
there are different circumstances under which the different outsourcing methods should
be considered. The difference is based upon the inherently governmental nature of the
function under consideration, and whether the function is critical to the accomplishment
of the military mission (i.e., a "core" function).
In the section on Government & The Public Interest, under the A-76 heading, the
FAR explicitly distinguishes between functions which are, and are not, inherently
governmental. According to the FAR, "as a matter of policy," an inherently governmental
function is one "that is so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate
performance by Government employees" (FAR 7.501,1999). Another definition of an
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inherently governmental function states that it is an activity "that is so intimately related
to the public interest as to mandate performance by Federal employees" (OMB Circular
A-76 Revised Supplemental Handbook, 1996). Thus, while there is some ambiguity as to
whether an inherently governmental function must be performed by Federal employees or
any governmental employee, it is clear that public-private partnerships are not suitable
and should not be considered when a function is deemed to be inherently governmental.
The Outsourcing Guide for Contracting supports this argument by addressing both
inherently governmental functions as well as "core" functions. According to the guide
Air Force functions fall within one of two categories: inherently
governmental (cannot outsource) and commercial activity (can
outsource). OMB Policy Letter 92-1, Inherently Governmental
Functions, provides guidance for Federal agencies to determine
which functions are inherently governmental. Commercial
activities, not inherently governmental functions may be
outsourced. A CA that is military essential, or prohibited by statute
must not be outsourced. (Outsourcing Guide for Contracting, 1996)
For definitions of Commercial activity, Inherently governmental activity, National
defense activity, and Military essential function, refer to Table 1.
The Brooks Initiative. The SAIC study draws a distinction between functions
which are and are not inherently governmental. Apparently, the study also adopts the
FAR definition of inherently governmental functions (in preference to the Outsourcing
Guide's definition) since the alternatives explored in the study allow for the performance
of some inherently governmental functions by other than Federal employees (i.e.,
employees of the City of San Antonio government).
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Investigative Question 3
The research related to Investigative Question 1 revealed that there is at least one
alternative (i.e., public-public partnerships) to the traditional outsourcing method in
which commercial activities are outsourced to private sector firms through public-private
partnerships. Our efforts to answer Investigative Question 2 showed that there are
different circumstances under which public-private and public-public outsourcing
arrangements should be considered. This investigative question asks whether different
outsourcing decision models are required as a result of the differences between the two
outsourcing alternatives. Our proposition is that the differences between public-private
and public-public outsourcing arrangements do mandate the use of different decision
models by decision-makers contemplating the outsourcing of base support functions.
Chapter 2 Findings. Our review of the literature revealed that a public-public
outsourcing decision model does not have to be completely distinct from a public-private
outsourcing decision model. Both decision models contain steps in which service
similarity and asset availability is addressed. Both require a cost-benefit analysis be
performed. However, the differences between public-private and public-public
outsourcing arrangements, and the circumstances under which each should be
appropriately considered, do require that a public-public outsourcing decision model
allow for the outsourcing of inherently governmental functions that are not mission
essential. Thus, while the differences between outsourcing decision models may be
slight, they are sufficiently significant to warrant the use of different decision models
according to the nature of the function under consideration.
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The Brooks Initiative. As stated in the previous chapter, no outsourcing decision
model was presented in the SAIC study. However, it is clear from the study that a
different decision model is warranted when contemplating the outsourcing of a function
via a public-public partnership. This is evidenced by the fact that the study spent a great
deal of time addressing the barriers to implementation of a public-public partnership
between Brooks AFB and the City of San Antonio. These barriers exist on numerous
levels (including Congress, the Executive branch, and the DoD) and are the result of
policy, procedure, or statute (SAIC, 1999). Many of these barriers, if not all, would not
confound a decision-maker using a decision model pertaining solely to the establishment
of a public-private outsourcing arrangement.

Investigative Question 4
Our response to Investigative Question 3 established that there is a legitimate
need for a separate decision model when considering either a public-private or publicpublic outsourcing arrangement. This question asks whether there is a decision model
currently available, and applicable, to the Federal Government that can be used when
making decisions concerning the initiation of public-public outsourcing partnerships. Our
proposition is that there are no decision models currently available, or applicable, to the
Federal Government with respect to the initiation of public-public outsourcing
partnerships.
Chapter 2 Findings. A review of the extant literature related to outsourcing (in
both the public and private sectors) revealed two explicitly developed outsourcing
decision models. These models are presented and discussed in Chapter 2 under the
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heading "Current Outsourcing Models." Admittedly, the review focused primarily upon
the literature related to outsourcing efforts of the public sector since we assumed that the
decision factors and processes used therein would be more germane to the topic of our
investigation.
For example, state and local governments must provide for the public interest of
their respective jurisdictions in the same way the Federal Government must protect and
provide for the public interest of the nation as a whole. The issue of public interest does
not concern private sector firms in the same way. These firms are free to outsource
functions to whomever they please so long as no illegal activity is taking place (e.g., the
violation of anti-trust legislation).
In reviewing the literature on public outsourcing efforts (of non-Federal entities),
we found that the A-76 guidance was used as a methodological guide in making
municipal (i.e., city government) outsourcing decisions (Prager and Desai, 1996).
Furthermore, with respect to outsourcing guidance and OFPP Policy Letter 92-1, it has
been suggested that "Despite its age and limitations, the OFPP policy offers the best
guidance available for today's decisions" (Burman, 1998: 62).
The first model discussed in the section on "Current Outsourcing Models"
captures the decision process followed by decision-makers using the A-76 guidance (see
Figure 4). As mentioned in that section, the model is inadequate for decision-makers
contemplating public-public outsourcing arrangements since no course of action is
available once the function is deemed to be a "core" (i.e., inherently governmental)
function.
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The second model identified and discussed in the section on "Current Outsourcing
Models" is an improvement upon the first (see Figure 5). However, while the RAND
study explores the need to consider alternative avenues of outsourcing (i.e., public
sources), their decision model does not adequately provide for this alternative. As seen in
the quote on page 26, the RAND study lists several sources and governance structures
through which the Federal Government could outsource the provision of its functions.
The list makes limited mention of public sources (inter-, or intra-service sources), and
does not look at inter-agency and inter-governmental possibilities.
Another concern we had with this model is in the way it is graphically depicted.
Apparently, the RAND model uses the terms "public" and "private" in the same sense as
the terms are used in the "traditional" model. The way in which the arrows are drawn
(and the usage of the terms "public" and "private") would suggest that if the answer to
any of the decision points is "no," then the proper course of action would be to retain the
function in-house.
The Brooks Initiative. The SAIC study does not explicitly contain a graphical
decision model. Nor does it make reference to any existing models which may have been
relied upon. Thus we must rely upon our findings in Chapter 2 and our analysis in
Chapter 4.

Investigative Question 5
Having established that differences between public-private and public-public
outsourcing arrangements necessitate the employment of different decision models, we
then determined that an adequate public-public decision model is lacking from the extant
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literature on outsourcing. Thus, we shall add to the body of literature by answering the
question "What would a decision model look like that could be used by the Federal
Government when evaluating functions which are not commercial activities available for
outsourcing, but which may be performed by other governmental agencies (i.e., publicpublic partnerships)." Our proposition is that the model developed in Chapter 2 can be
used by the Federal Government when making decisions concerning the initiation of
public-public outsourcing partnerships.
Based upon our findings in Chapter 4, our proposition was not supported. We
found that our conceptual decision model could not be used, unless some changes were
made to it, by decision-makers responsible for public-public outsourcing decisions. The
two models are similar with respect to the steps in which alternatives are developed and
analyzed, and recommendations are made. While these steps, and the elements
considered as part of each step, are not sequentially identical, they are, for the most part,
substantially similar.
As a result of our analysis in Chapter 4, we have developed an analytical model of
the public-public outsourcing decision process (see Figure 11). Since this model
incorporates our findings from the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 as well as our analysis
reported in Chapter 4, we believe the analytical model provides a reasonable depiction of
what a public-public outsourcing decision model should look like.
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Figure 11. An Analytical Model of the Public-Public Outsourcing Decision Process
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Summary
This chapter presented the investigative questions and our propositions along with
the results of our research and the analysis of those results. All of our propositions were
supported with the exception of the one related to Investigative Question 5.
With respect to Investigative Question 1, our research and case analysis
established that public-public outsourcing arrangements are a viable alternative to
traditional public-private outsourcing methods used for commercial activities. However,
our research and case analysis conducted in response to Investigative Question 2 showed
that there are different circumstances under which each outsourcing arrangement should
be considered. Our findings regarding Investigative Question 3 established that, as a
result of the differences between public-private and public-public outsourcing
arrangements, especially with respect to the circumstances under which each is
appropriately considered, different outsourcing decision models were warranted.
Our research and analysis in response to Investigative Question 4 established that
no explicit or comprehensive decision models currently exist within the extant literature
on outsourcing that could be used by decision-makers in the Federal Government who are
contemplating a public-public outsourcing arrangement. In order to answer Investigative
Question 5, we developed an analytical model based upon a comparison of our
conceptual model and the process model underlying the Brooks AFB initiative. The
analytical model thus depicts a decision model which can be of use to decision-makers
contemplating a public-public outsourcing arrangement as well as the overall process
through which the decision-maker must proceed in order to make the public-public
outsourcing arrangement a reality.
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VI. Conclusion
The Department of Defense is currently considering innovative ideas to reduce
the operating costs of its remaining bases. One idea (which inspired this research effort),
was to reduce base operating and infrastructure costs though the implementation of
public-public partnerships. Since the Air Force had already contracted with S AIC to
perform a study on the feasibility of this idea with respect to Brooks AFB and the City of
San Antonio, we decided to investigate how public-public outsourcing decisions are
made.
As we considered the idea of public-public partnerships, we felt it was first
necessary to examine whether there was a fundamental difference between the nature of
the functions to be outsourced under public-private outsourcing arrangements and publicpublic partnerships. If there was none, then it would be reasonable to use the current A76 outsourcing process and guidance to make public-public outsourcing decisions. If
there was a difference in the nature of the functions, then we believed it would be
beneficial to examine whether any outsourcing decision models currently existed and
could be used by the Air Force when making outsourcing decisions that would involve
the creation of public-public partnerships.
The remainder of this chapter contains several conclusions we have made as a
result of our research and analysis. Some limitations of our research effort are discussed,
as well. Our recommendations for future research are offered at the end of this chapter.
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The Nature and Performance of Functions
A fundamental difference exists between the types of base functions that can be
outsourced using public-private arrangements and those that can use public-public
partnerships. The difference is in whether a function is or is not inherently governmental.
The FAR and the OMB Circular A-76, along with other outsourcing guidance, support
this conclusion by drawing a clear distinction between those functions which can be
outsourced to private sector firms, and those that cannot. What is less clear according to
current guidance, however, is which functions can be shared or moved between agencies
regardless of whether the agency is at the Federal, state, or local level.
The FAR and OMB Circular A-76 are seemingly at odds, however, over how to
handle those functions which are deemed to be inherently governmental. The FAR states
that Government employees must perform inherently governmental functions. OMB
Circular A-76 states that Federal employees must perform these types of functions. Our
efforts have shown that the ambiguity is of little concern to decision-makers determined
to pursue innovative methods of cost reduction. The analytical decision model developed
herein should serve as a practical aid to decision-makers in determining when
performance by Federal employees is required and when performance by any
governmental employee will suffice.

Development of the Analytical Model
This section contains comments on our comparison of the conceptual model with
the process model underlying the Brooks AFB initiative. The comments are intended to
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explain our rationale for making changes to the conceptual model during the development
of the analytical model.
Baselining Costs. Determining the baseline costs of all potential outsourcing
candidates prior to the development of alternatives does allow the decision-maker to
concentrate his efforts on those functions with the highest potential payoff from
outsourcing. We believe it is more appropriate, however, to baseline the cost of a
function after it has been determined that the function is inherently governmental, but not
mission critical. This would save the time and cost expended to baseline the cost of
functions that could not be considered for outsourcing (even to a non-Federal
governmental entity).
Development of Alternatives. Our comparison of the two models revealed that
each model allows for the consideration of "Mission Criticality," "Service Similarity,"
and "Asset Availability." There were two primary differences, however. First, our model
explicitly allows for consideration of outsourcing an inherently governmental (albeit,
non-mission critical) function to any other form/level of government. The Brooks AFB
model considers only potential partnerships with the city government for certain
functions. We conclude that in order for a decision model to be as comprehensive as
possible, it should require decision-makers to consider the possibility of outsourcing
functions to any form/level of government.
The second difference between the models is that the Brooks AFB model
addresses the barriers to the implementation of possible outsourcing arrangements, with
respect to the function under consideration. This element of the decision process was not
included in our model, but should be included in order to make it more realistic and
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comprehensive. Clearly, as is evidenced in the Brooks AFB study, there are many
potential barriers to outsourcing certain functions that exist on different levels. If not
identified and considered early in the decision process, these barriers could negate the
decision-maker's efforts.
Analysis of Alternatives. The cost-benefit analysis of the outsourcing alternatives
developed during the Brooks AFB initiative process is quite thorough. However, the
analysis of alternatives did not explicitly include a discussion of the TCE or Agency
Theory issues addressed in our review of the literature (e.g., asset specificity,
opportunism, safeguards, moral hazard, and adverse selection).
The Brooks AFB initiative process also failed to explicitly address concerns
related to the Federal Government's ability to retract from its arrangements with the city
government. The many concerns related to strategic partnering (discussed in Chapter 2)
are relevant to this issue. It is worth noting that
To bring a service contract in-house commanders must perform a
cost comparison. If in-house performance is cheaper, commanders
can return to in-house civilian operation only. No military
positions are normally authorized. Return to military performance
is very rare and must be approved by Air Staff [all emphasis in
original]. (Outsourcing Guide for Contracting, 1996)
Thus, the consideration of strategic imperatives and issues related to control and
flexibility must be included in any comprehensive cost-benefit analysis. A decision to
outsource (to any firm or entity, public or private) may lead to undesired consequences in
the absence of such considerations.
Recommended Approach. Both models compared in Chapter 4 provide for a
recommendation. In the Brooks AFB process model, the recommended approach stands
apart from the other alternatives analyzed in that it specifically took the identified barriers
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to its implementation into consideration. This was done using risk-adjusted rates of return
to account for implementation risks.
The model, which we developed in Chapter 2, also provides for a
recommendation (i.e., if the comprehensive cost-benefit analysis is favorable, then the
recommended approach is to pursue a public-public partnership). The analysis of a
recommended approach is implicitly included within the step in which the comprehensive
cost-benefit analysis is performed on all alternatives. Whereas the Brooks AFB model
only explicitly included an analysis of the implementation barriers with respect to the
recommended approach, we believe it is appropriate and worthwhile that a
comprehensive cost-benefit analysis address the costs of overcoming the implementation
barriers related to each alternative under consideration.
Implementation Plan. After comparing the model we developed with the Brooks
AFB model, we have concluded that in order to complete the decision process an
implementation plan should be developed. This conclusion is supported by the literature
on decision-making (see Hill and others, 1981: 22). The Brooks AFB model contains an
extensive plan to implement its recommended approach; including a time-line and draft
legislation. Therefore, we have added a step to our conceptual model in which the
decision-maker must 1) develop an implementation time-line, 2) prepare and execute the
necessary steps to overcome implementation barriers, and 3) execute the contract or
agreement with the non-Federal governmental entity.
Limitations
The limitation of greatest concern to us throughout this project has been that we
were only able to work with a single, albeit extraordinary, case (i.e., the Brooks AFB
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initiative). Thus, while the conceptual model we developed was based upon an in-depth
review of the extant outsourcing-related literature, and compared favorably with the
process model followed in the Brooks AFB initiative, it cannot be assumed to be
generalizable across all cases.
Another limitation of the research was our reliance on two sources of evidence
during our analysis of the Brooks AFB initiative case. We relied upon briefing slides and
the AFMC Special Study for Brooks Air Force Base, both of which were provided by the
Business Development Office at Brooks AFB. Ideally, we would have had access to
internal documents and conducted interviews with key players in the decision process in
an effort to triangulate evidence on a particular issue, decision, or concept.
Recommendations for Future Research
As a result of our experiences throughout this endeavor, we have identified some
opportunities for future research. These recommendations are related to the methodology
we employed, and to the concept of public-public outsourcing. It is our hope that this
exploratory effort will be helpful to future researchers as intrigued as we in the potential
of public-public outsourcing partnerships.
With respect to the methodology we employed, we encourage future researchers
to apply the analytical decision model we developed to a variety of cases. This may have
to wait some time as the Federal Government has only just begun to consider the publicpublic option. However, as the model is applied to more cases in which public-public
outsourcing is considered as an option, the validity and power of the model will be
enhanced.
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With respect to the concept of public-public outsourcing, we recommend that
future researchers investigate the factors that may contribute to the success, or failure, of
a public-public outsourcing arrangement. While outside the scope of our efforts, we
entertained the notion that some military bases (and other governmental entities) may be
ill suited for entering into public-public partnerships. This could be related to the level of
transaction costs involved (e.g., the assets available from the base or governmental entity
may be insufficient). It may also have to do with the base's mission, or the
geography/population of the surrounding area. In any case, we believe further study is
warranted insofar as we believe that there are other bases that could benefit from the
initiatives being considered by Brooks AFB.

Closing Remarks
The Brooks AFB initiative process demonstrates how the Department of Defense
is committed to reducing its operating costs while, at the same time, improving its
method of operations. The idea of outsourcing support functions to non-Federal
governmental entities is innovative and full of potential. Hopefully, decision-makers will
no longer be constrained by the traditional A-76 process, or the mentality that inherently
governmental functions must be performed by Federal Government employees (whether
civilian or military).
We are hopeful that the analytical model developed as a result of this research
effort will be of use to decision-makers contemplating the idea of a public-public
partnership. While we admit the model should be subjected to further research, we
believe it is a valuable starting point from which to embark upon the outsourcing journey.
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We are pleased, in any case, that the Department of Defense has taken the lead in
expanding the Federal Government's realm of outsourcing opportunities.
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